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The Impact of Management’s Tone on the Perception of Management’s
Credibility in Forecasting

Robert D. Slater Jr.

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of management
altering its tone in communications on participants’ perceptions of management
credibility. Management’s tone in communicating with participants was
manipulated using communications from management under two treatment
conditions. In period one of the study management’s tone was manipulated
within the management statement on internal controls as required by the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board’s (PCAOB) Auditing Standards No. 2. In
period one, participants had no knowledge of management’s prior forecasting
accuracy. Consistent with predicted hypotheses, the findings reveal that
management can increase its credibility with participants by communicating its
empathy, responsiveness, and understanding. Management’s increased
credibility was measured using both a validated credibility scale and by
examining participants’ reliance on management’s forecasts. In period two of the
study all participants had knowledge of management’s forecast failure in period
one. The results from period two found that tone could impact the rating of
vii

management’s credibility when management had previously failed to meet a
forecast but that tone had no impact on participant’s changes in their earnings
per share estimates after management had previously failed to meet a forecast.

viii

1.0 Introduction
The stock market has placed a great deal of importance on companies
meeting earnings estimates, with stock prices often dropping for companies that
fail to meet estimates. In addition to a drop in share price, management can lose
credibility for failing to meet projected forecasts (Williams 1996; Mercer 2005).
Credibility plays an important role in management’s ability to signal the market
about its expected earnings and the market’s beliefs about management’s
earnings signal (Williams 1996; Hirst et al. 1999; Mercer 2001). The market will
align with management’s beliefs when it receives signals from management that
it perceives as more credible (Verrecchia 1983; Verrecchia 1990). Therefore, it
is important to study ways in which management credibility can be enhanced,
allowing management to communicate with the market in a more efficient
manner.
Developing an understanding of the factors that affect management
credibility will allow us to gain a better understanding of how management is able
to communicate its beliefs about earnings to the market. However, there is some
debate in the literature about the factors that make up credibility. The most recent
studies have assumed that credibility is a two factor construct consisting of
trustworthiness and expertise (Hirst 1994; Mercer 2004; Mercer 2005), while
there is evidence from the persuasion literature that credibility is a three factor
1

construct that includes as the third factor perceived intentions of the
communicator (McCroskey and Teven 1999).
The objective of this research is to test whether management’s credibility
is impacted by investors’ perceptions of management’s intentions toward them.
Also, in an attempt to reconcile the theoretical model of source credibility from
McCroskey and Teven (1999) with the findings from accounting studies
(Jennings 1987; Williams 1996; Hirst et al. 1999; Mercer 2005), the impact of
changes in management’s credibility on participants’ judgments will be examined.
Specifically, this study examines participants’ ratings of management credibility
and their reliance on information provided by management.
To investigate participants’ perceptions of management’s credibility, this
research manipulates management’s tone in written communications and
measures the ensuing impact on participants’ perceptions of management’s
credibility. The research investigates whether changing the tone in written
communications allows management to alter participants’ perceptions of
management’s intentions; thereby, increasing perceived credibility and also the
degree to which participants rely on management’s forecast guidance (Hovland
et al. 1953; McCroskey and Teven 1999). The research also investigates
whether management’s loss of credibility for failing to meet a projected forecast
of earnings per share can be mitigated by the tone management uses to convey
the news to shareholders in a written communication.
The study manipulates management’s tone in two communications with
participants under different circumstances. The first manipulation of
2

management’s tone will be delivered with the financial statements, in
management’s statement about the company’s internal controls, as mandated by
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s (PCAOB)(2004) Auditing
Standard No. 2, “An Audit of Internal Control over Financial Reporting Performed
in Conjunction with an Audit of Financial Statements.” This is a new standard that
calls for management to report to investors on the internal controls of its
company. While the report on internal controls is a mandatory communication
management must make to investors, the wording of the report has not been
specified by the PCAOB. This report was selected for study because it presents
an opportunity to examine the possible effect different wording of a newly
mandated report may have on investors’ judgments.
Management’s tone is also manipulated after participants receive actual
financial results for which management has inaccurately forecasted. As stated
previously, management’s credibility should be reduced when it fails to meet a
forecast (Jennings 1987; Hirst 1994; Williams 1996; Mercer 2005). The tone in
management’s letter informing participants about the actual results of the quarter
will be manipulated and the effects will be measured on both the perception of
management’s credibility (measured by a credibility rating) and on the reliance on
information supplied by management (measured by participants’ reliance on
management’s forecasts).
The results of this research should inform policymakers, such as the
PCAOB, as to the effect different wording can have in communicating with
investors. As indicated, Auditing Standard No. 2 (PCAOB, 2004, §163), leaves
3

the exact wording of the management statement on internal control up to
management, stating that the report can “take many forms” as long as
management states a direct conclusion about the effectiveness of internal
controls. If it is found that subtle wording differences in required reports can
impact investors’ perceptions, then the PCAOB may want to consider restricting
the wording that could be used in such reports.
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the
theoretical background of the study and develops the proposed hypotheses. Prior
studies investigating management credibility in forecasting will be examined in
reference to a model of credibility from persuasion studies (O'Keefe 1990;
McCroskey and Teven 1999; Perloff 2003). Formal hypotheses will be developed
based on the theoretical model proposed. Chapter 3 explains the research
method used to test the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 2. Also in Chapter 3,
each of the variables in the study is defined. A formal research model is
presented as well as the proposed statistical analyses of each of the hypotheses.
The results of three pilot studies are also discussed. In Chapter 4, H1 through H4
are statistically tested and results are presented to support the findings from the
study. After analyzing the predicted results a post hoc analysis is conducted to
examine the credibility construct further. Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of
the study and presents the conclusions drawn from the analysis of the study.
Limitations of the study are also presented in Chapter 5, as well as the overall
contributions of the study.

4

2.0. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses Development
This chapter begins with a discussion of the impact of credibility on
management forecasts. A formal model of the two factors (surprise and
credibility) that have been found to affect investors’ belief revisions, with regard
to management forecasts, is presented. Each of the factors (surprise and
credibility) is discussed in general, and prior studies that have examined these
factors are presented. One of the factors of this model – credibility – will be
further analyzed within the context of source credibility theory (Hovland and
Weiss 1951; O'Keefe 1990). A three factor model of credibility is discussed
(McCroskey and Teven 1999), as are two measures of credibility – the impact of
management’s past forecast accuracy and its tone in communications with
investors. Based on source credibility theory, four hypotheses are then proposed
regarding the effects of altering the tone of communications with investors and
how the tone can influence management’s perceived credibility and the amount
by which investors rely on management forecasts.
2.1 Credibility and Management Forecasting
Firms are required by the Securities and Exchange Commission to report
certain financial information to investors. Additionally, many firms go beyond the
mandated disclosures and make voluntary disclosures to investors. One example
of a voluntary disclosure is a management earnings forecast.
5

Voluntary disclosures, such as earnings forecasts, allow managers to
share knowledge that is not already available to investors, and thereby reduce
the amount of information asymmetry (Ajinkya and Gift 1984). For management
to determine whether to release voluntary information to investors, management
needs to have an understanding of the true value of the information,1 the costs of
disclosing the information, and an understanding of investors’ expectations.
Management’s optimal threshold level of disclosure is simultaneously dependent
on these three variables (Verrecchia 1983; Kim and Verrecchia 1991). Some
analytical models of disclosure hold that once management reaches the
disclosure threshold it always discloses truthfully, since it may face lawsuits if
disclosures do not match the actual results (Hughes 1986). Research findings
looking at management forecast disclosures are mixed as to whether
management is truthful (i.e., unbiased) in its disclosures. Some studies have
looked at management’s earnings forecasts and compared the forecasts to the
actual results for the period and found that management’s forecasts were
positively biased (Penman 1980; Waymire 1984; Clarkson et al. 1992;
Mcconomy 1998). While other studies, such as the one done by McNichols
(1989), found no evidence that earnings forecasts were systematically biased,
positively or negatively, but did find that investors did not take management
forecasts at face value. McNichol’s finding indicates that investors perceived
management’s forecasts as biased, or lacking some credibility.

1

The “true value of the information” is the understanding by management of the economic and
competitive advantage of the information (Verrecchia 1983).

6

For the purposes of this study, whether or not management forecasts are
actually biased is not as important as the finding that investors perceive
management’s forecasts as biased, and discount them. Finding that investors do
not react as if management discloses honestly does not invalidate Verrecchia’s
findings that management’s optimal threshold level is dependent on the type of
information, disclosure costs, and current market expectations. Instead the
threshold level of disclosure shifts to a value that can include additional
disclosure costs to establish management’s credibility with investors. The
increase in disclosure costs shifts management’s optimal level of disclosure to a
point where greater information asymmetry must be present before management
benefits from disclosure.
This study investigates the effectiveness of a low cost method of
influencing management’s perceived credibility. Management’s goodwill or
perceived intentions, a factor affecting credibility, could potentially be
manipulated at relatively low cost. Increasing management’s disclosure credibility
with a low cost option such as modifying the tone of written communications with
investors increases the quality of management’s disclosure, thereby, lowering the
threshold at which management chooses to reduce information asymmetry
(Verrecchia 1990).

7

2.2
2.2.1

Credibility and Investor Belief Revision
Investors’ Reliance on Earnings Forecasts
Several empirical models offer a basis for determining how users

incorporate management forecasts into their own beliefs. These models all
contain management credibility or a similar construct (Patell 1976; King et al.
1990; Williams 1996; Hirst et al. 1999; Mercer 2001). The goal of this study is not
to redefine these models into one single unified model; instead the goal of this
study is to examine management credibility, one of the main factors of these
models. It is generally held that the amount by which a user’s belief is revised is
a combination of the credibility of management in making the disclosure and the
surprise element of the information contained in the disclosure. Jennings (1987)
proposes that the amount of belief revision is modeled as an interaction between
management’s credibility and the newness (surprise) of the information contained
in the forecast. The Jennings model is consistent with findings in accounting
research on forecasts (Williams 1996; Mercer 2001), and models of credibility
from the psychology literature (Hovland and Weiss 1951; Hovland et al. 1953;
Hovland and Pritzker 1957; O'Keefe 1990; McCroskey and Teven 1999; Perloff
2003).
The current study adapts the Jennings (1987) model, in that it models
credibility and surprise as affecting investor belief revision. However, since the
current study holds the degree of surprise constant for all participants, the
interaction of surprise with credibility is not modeled. In the following section I

8

briefly discuss the notion of “surprise” before going on to discuss belief revision
and credibility, which are the constructs of interest in this study.
2.2.2

Information Surprise
The surprise of the information contained in the forecast is the difference

between the investor’s current level of belief based on the information set
currently held and the new information in the forecast. Surprise is a measure of
the degree of information asymmetry between management and investors.
Surprise also represents the maximum belief revision management expects to
generate with its disclosure, since the purpose of its disclosure is to bring
investors’ expectations in line with its own. Management’s expectation that it can
change beliefs is supported by studies in psychology that have found that a
portion of a subject’s opinion change is a function of the difference between the
current beliefs a subject has and the beliefs advocated by a communicator
(Ewing 1942; Hovland and Pritzker 1957). Greater opinion changes occur when
the difference between the subject’s beliefs and the communicator’s advocated
message is larger. Surprise has also been referred to as the degree of
conformity.2 The current study does not manipulate surprise between
participants but instead seeks to hold it relatively constant across participants in
order to examine the impact of credibility.

2

The degree of conformity can be an opinion in the same direction (pro-attitudinal) or in an
opposite direction (counter-attitudinal). For example, both the receiver and the communicator can
have the same pro-attitude toward a message but have a different level of belief.

9

2.2.3

Belief Revision
Belief revision in this study is defined as the difference between the

current level of beliefs held by participants before receiving new information from
management and the participants’ revised level of beliefs after receiving new
information from management. Belief revision will equal the amount of surprise if
the participants fully revise their beliefs to the new information provided by
management. According to some analytical models of disclosure, the current
level of investors’ beliefs is one of the factors management must identify when
deciding to make a disclosure (Verrecchia 1983; Kim and Verrecchia 1991).
Disclosure costs increase as the difference between management’s disclosure
and the market’s current level of belief increases. These costs can be actual
costs paid for assurance on disclosures, the cost of compiling the information,
costs associated with the loss of proprietary information, and indirect costs such
as those related to credibility.
Measuring the market’s current level of belief is difficult to do. Prior
accounting studies looking at management disclosures have used proxies for the
market’s current level of belief. One such proxy was the stock price of a security
before management released its information (McNichols 1989). Other studies
have used earnings per share estimates of analysts, and proxy the market’s
current level of belief as the composite analyst forecast (Kasnik and Lev 1995).
Behavioral studies looking at disclosure have given participants base information,
such as the analysts’ composite forecast, to proxy for the market’s level of belief
(Libby and Tan 1999; Mercer 2005). Giving participants base information is a
10

weakness in prior studies because it forces participants to integrate the given
base information with their true current level of belief. Since their true or initial
level of belief is not known, this leads to an anchoring and adjustment (Tversky
and Kahneman 1974) effect that is not captured in the study.
Hirst et al. (1999) tried to control for differences between participants’
initial levels of beliefs by using the participants’ initial predictions as a covariate in
the data analysis. However, they also gave all of the participants (in each
treatment) the same information regarding actual earnings. Therefore, to the
extent that the difference between the initial prediction and actual earnings would
vary across participants, the degree of surprise would have varied across
participants potentially confounding the results. This study takes a unique
approach to controlling for the interaction of the participants’ current level of
beliefs and management’s disclosure. Instead of controlling for the current level
of beliefs by giving participants a starting point, participants will be able to select
their initial earnings per share estimate, and the actual earnings number released
by management will be revealed as a set percentage increase over each
participant’s initial prediction, thereby holding the degree of surprise relatively
constant across participants. The approach taken in this study removes the
possibility of an unmeasured anchoring effect that may have taken place in prior
studies.
2.2.4

Credibility
The factor affecting belief revision that is of interest in this study is the

communicator’s credibility. Credibility is a measure of the perceived believability
11

of a communicator, where the perception of credibility is made by a message
recipient (perceiver) (O'Keefe 1990). Credibility is not a trait that can be directly
observed. The amount of perceived credibility held by any one communicator
may vary from one message recipient to another (O'Keefe 1990). Some message
recipients will find one communicator highly credible while other recipients do not
(O'Keefe 1990). This is easily seen in the realm of politics where one candidate
can be seen as quite credible by his/her followers but not very credible by those
who support his/her opponent.
Only one prior accounting study has looked at management’s credibility
using a psychological model similar to the one used in this study. Management
credibility is modeled by Mercer (2005) as the trustworthiness and expertise of
management, which is consistent with prior models of credibility from the
persuasion literature (O'Keefe 1990; Perloff 2003). Mercer (2005) looked at
management’s failure to warn investors of a negative news surprise, and
measured the failure’s impact on investor’s perception of management’s
credibility. The study found management’s actions did impact credibility ratings;
however, no assessment was made on how the change in credibility impacted
investors’ reliance on management’s forecasts. Participants were asked if they
would rely on future disclosures, and those who were in the higher credibility
manipulation (i.e., the ones who were warned) did state they would rely on future
disclosures. Therefore, while accounting research suggests that credibility is
composed of more than one factor (see Figure 1), the link between credibility
ratings and investor judgments remains untested. To establish the link between
12

perceived credibility and investor judgments (specifically in a belief revision task)
I use source credibility theory as applied in psychology and marketing.
Source credibility theory posits that in most circumstances, the more
credible a communicator, the more likely the communication will elicit change of
beliefs in message recipients (Hovland and Weiss 1951; Hovland et al. 1953;
O'Keefe 1990; DeZoort et al. 2003; Perloff 2003).3 In Figure 1, as the perceived
credibility increases, so does the amount of investors’ belief revision.
Period One

Period Two

No Prior Information About
Management’s Forecast
Accuracy

Management’s Forecast
Inaccuracy for Period One is
Known
H3
Change in Perceived Credibility
From Period One to Period Two

Management’s
Internal Control
Letter:

H

Perceived Credibility:

Perceived Credibility:

Expertise

Expertise

Trustworthiness

Trustworthiness

Intention

Intention

1

Management’s Earnings
Results Letter:
-High Intention Tone

-High Intention Tone
H2

-No Intention Tone

Investor’s Belief Revision
(Change in EPS
Predictions Period One,
Before and After
Management’s
Prediction)

-No Intention Tone

Change In Investor’s
Belief Revision
(Change in EPS
Predictions Period Two,
Before and After
Management’s
Prediction)

H4
Difference in Change in Investor’s Belief Revision
From Period One to Period Two

Figure 1. Investor Belief Revision Model
3

The circumstances in which more credibility does not equal more opinion change are discussed
in detail in Appendix A as moderators to the model of credibility.
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As indicated, support for the impact of perceived credibility on belief
revision is found in marketing and psychology research (Gotlieb et al. 1992;
Goldsmith et al. 2000; Lafferty et al. 2002). Goldsmith et al. (2000) examined
both corporate credibility and endorser credibility and found that both impact
users’ intentions to purchase products. The endorser credibility impacted the
users’ attitude toward the advertisement, which in turn affected their intention to
purchase, and attitude toward the brand. However, corporate credibility directly
impacted users’ intention to purchase, as well as attitude toward the brand and
attitude toward the ad (Goldsmith et al. 2000). Lafferty et al. (2002) tested the
results of Goldsmith et al. (2000) and found support for corporate credibility
directly impacting intention to purchase as well as the other paths found in
Goldsmith et al. (2000). In several disciplines, the “intention to act” construct is
used as a proxy for actual behavior based on the theory of planned behavior
(Ajzen 2001). This link between perceived credibility and user behavior provides
support for the belief that investors’ perceptions of management’s credibility can
impact investors’ decision-making.
2.2.5

Perceived Management Credibility Factors
In order to understand what makes a communicator credible it is important

to understand the factors that affect perceived credibility. Most studies of
credibility use a two-factor model of credibility similar to the one used in Mercer’s
(2005) study, with the two factors being expertise and trustworthiness
(McGinnies and Ward 1980). This study employs the McCroskey and Teven
(1999) model of credibility, which includes three factors: expertise,
14

trustworthiness and intentions. Since this model has not been used in judgment
and decision making research, a factor analysis was conducted to examine the
three factors. Using an oblique rotation, the factor analysis suggested the 18
questions loaded on three unique factors4. Sixteen of the questions loaded on
the correct factor, while two questions loaded higher on a factor other than their
expected variable. The three original variables from McCroskey and Teven’s
(1999) model were used in this study. No adjustment was made to the model for
the two variables that loaded on a different factor in the factor analysis. Rather
than examining the three factors individually, the main analyses in this study use
all 18 questions of the credibility scale to measure total credibility. Thus, the
discrepancy in the factor loadings does not impact the analyses in this study but
should be addressed in future research. To determine if the three sub-factors
were measuring the same higher level credibility factor a Cronbach’s Alpha was
calculated for the responses to the scale in the study from period one and period
two. The three sub-factors of credibility had a Cronbach’s Alpha of .912 for
period one and .926 for period two.
2.2.5.1

Expertise

Hovland et al. (1953) define expertness as “the extent to which a
communicator is perceived to be a source of valid assertions” (pg. 21). The more
a perceiver believes someone is an expert in his/her field, the more credible the
perceiver will find the communicator’s messages as they pertain to that particular

4

Two factors had Eigenvalues above 1 (11.959 and 1.706) with a third factor having an
Eigenvalue of .97.
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field. Prior research has found many different attributes can signal that someone
is an expert (Hovland et al. 1953). Hovland et al. (1953) identify age, position of
leadership, and similarity between perceiver and communicator as factors that
may invoke a perception of expertise. The research to date (Hovland and Weiss
1951; Hovland et al. 1953; O'Keefe 1990; Perloff 2003), indicates that
communicators who are perceived as having greater expertise will be found to be
more credible. The perception of expertise should be held constant in period one
of the study. However, the manipulation in period two should cause expertise to
drop since management fails to meet its forecast.
2.2.5.2

Trustworthiness

Hovland et al. (1953) define trustworthiness as “the degree of confidence in
the communicator’s intent to communicate the assertions he considers most
valid” (pg. 21). It is possible for a communicator to be an expert in his/her
domain but decide to communicate statements known to be invalid (Hovland et
al. 1953). Message recipients must form an opinion as to whether they believe
an expert communicator is communicating truthfully. Those communicators
perceived to be communicating truthfully are thought to have greater credibility.
The perception of trustworthiness should be constant in period one of the study.
However, the manipulation in period two should cause trustworthiness to drop
since management fails to meet its forecast.
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2.2.5.3

Goodwill (Intention Toward the Receiver)

Hovland et al. (1953) also discussed a third factor of credibility, which they
called “intention toward the receiver.” As stated previously, trustworthiness
measures the degree of confidence a receiver has in a communicator’s intention.
The intention toward the receiver construct is the belief a receiver has about the
communicator’s intention for communicating an assertion. Intention toward the
receiver measures the belief about the communicator’s intentions, and
trustworthiness measures the degree of confidence in the belief. McCroskey and
Teven (1999) propose that the construct’s goodwill and intentions towards the
receiver are the same; thus, the third factor in their model of credibility is
goodwill. Goodwill has been excluded in some credibility models over the years
because researchers believed that goodwill could not be measured properly
(McCroskey and Teven 1999). McCroskey and Teven (1999) blame the poor
measurements on factor analytic models that included extraneous “person
perception” variables that hindered results.
In this study, I will use McCroskey and Teven’s (1999) validated instrument
to measure goodwill. However, I use the term “intention” or “intention toward the
receiver,” since the term “goodwill” has another connotation in the field of
accounting. (In accounting, goodwill is a measure of the purchase price of a
company over its fair value.) There are three distinct elements to the intention
factor: understanding, empathy, and responsiveness (McCroskey and Teven
1999). Understanding is defined as knowing another person’s ideas, feelings,
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and needs. Empathy is an acceptance of another’s view as valid.
Responsiveness is viewed as the attentiveness of one to another.
2.2.5.4

Other Factors That Can Impact the Effect of Credibility

There are other factors that have been identified in the psychology
literature that are believed to moderate credibility’s impact on belief revision. For
example, the expected and actual position advocated by the message have been
found to affect the perception of credibility factors (Eagly et al. 1978). How well
liked the communicator is can affect credibility (Heider 1958; McCroskey 1966).
Contextual factors such as the message recipient’s level of involvement with the
topic (a combination of expertise and motivation), the degree of difference
between current receiver beliefs and the beliefs presented in the message, and
timing of identifying the communicator have been found to impact the effect
credibility has on a message recipient’s belief revision (O'Keefe 1990). Because
these factors are theoretically important, they will be included as possible
covariates in the experiment; however, only the intention factor of credibility is
measured in the current study. See Appendix A for a discussion of the
moderating factors.
2.2.6

Measuring Credibility Factors
While only one other accounting study (Mercer 2005) has tested credibility

as a perception variable, other studies in accounting have explored the concept
of credibility. Most studies, even in psychology, have difficulty separating and
manipulating the first two factors of credibility, expertise and trustworthiness
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(O'Keefe 1990). This is especially true in accounting studies, where one
measure for management credibility is management’s past forecast accuracy
(Williams 1996; Hirst et al. 1999). Past accuracy in forecasting is a noisy
measure of expertise or trustworthiness since participants do not know if
management failed to make its forecast because it did not have the expertise to
forecast correctly, or because it was intentionally misleading investors.
2.2.6.1

Forecast Accuracy Information

As indicated in the prior paragraph, extant accounting studies looking at
the relationship between management’s credibility and investors’ reactions to
forecasts have used management’s prior forecast accuracy as a proxy for
management’s forecast credibility (Baginski and Hassell 1990; Williams 1996;
Hirst et al. 1999; Mercer 2001; Mercer 2004; Mercer 2005). Some studies
assumed that investors’ reactions to an earnings forecast are a function of
management’s credibility and the surprise or newness of the information being
presented (Jennings 1987; Baginski and Hassell 1990; Williams 1996). Mercer’s
studies (2001, 2004, 2005) measured management’s credibility as a perception
variable with two factors, expertise and trustworthiness. Consistent with research
findings that it is difficult to separate expertise and trustworthiness, Mercer found
expertise and trustworthiness highly correlated variables that move together.
Hirst et al. (1999) found evidence that credibility, as measured by prior
forecast accuracy, was a significant factor in the earnings predictions of investors
who used a management forecast in their decision-making. Archival studies
have also explored the relationship between management’s prior accuracy in
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forecasting and the reaction of analysts to subsequent forecasts (Hassell et al.
1988; Williams 1996). These studies differ only in the methods used and
measurement of the variables. For example, Hassell et al.(1988) measured the
effect of management earnings forecasts on the revision in earnings estimates of
analysts, where the amount of change in analyst forecasts was dependent on
management’s credibility as measured by the difference in earnings forecasts to
actual earnings. They used the ex-post accuracy (actual accuracy) of previous
forecasts to define management’s credibility. They found that analyst forecasts
did change after the release of a management projection. The study implies that
analysts’ beliefs were revised based on the credibility (prior accuracy) of
management forecasts.
Williams (1996) also studied prior forecast accuracy of management and
operationalized prior accuracy as prior forecast usefulness, where usefulness is
measured by whether a user would have been better off adjusting expectations
of earnings to management’s forecast in a prior period. The relationship between
the usefulness of a prior earnings forecast and analysts’ responses to a current
forecast was studied. Exogenous variables, such as timing of the forecast and
market price reactions, were controlled. As predicted, management’s credibility
(as determined by its prior forecasting ability) affected the way in which analysts
reacted to current forecasts (Williams 1996). Therefore, when management’s
prior forecasts were accurate, investors’ perceptions of management’s credibility
increased. The increases in perceived credibility lead to analysts relying on future
management forecasts when making their own forecasts.
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Benjamin and Strawser (1976) conducted a behavioral study that looked
at prior forecast accuracy. They gave investors annual reports that had earnings
forecasts contained within the notes to the financial statements. Participants
were told of the prior year’s forecast and actual results. Prior forecast accuracy
was found to increase investors’ perceived credibility of management’s current
forecast, as measured by participants’ earnings per share predictions relative to
management’s forecast.
In the Benjamin and Strawser study, participants were given explanations
as to why prior management forecasts may have been inaccurate. These
explanations included environmental variables that would not be directly
attributable to management. Thus, Benjamin and Strawser’s results may have
been affected by beliefs that management was not to blame for failing to forecast
correctly. Accordingly, the effect on investor’s perceptions of management being
at fault for an inaccurate forecast is not known.
The accuracy of an earnings forecast is a function of management’s
forecasting ability and the business risks facing the firm (Davidson and Neu
1993). Figure 2 models this relationship as presented in Davidson and Neu
(1993). A manager can only make a forecast based on contemporaneous
information available at the time he/she forecasts. If management uses sound
procedures and valid assumptions in forecasting and still fails to forecast
accurately, unforeseeable business risk factors could be contributing to actual
earnings deviating from the forecast. Based on Davidson and Neu (1993), it is
possible management’s prior forecast accuracy is a poor proxy for
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management’s credibility. Further complicating the validity of forecast accuracy
as a proxy for credibility is fundamental attribution error theory. This theory
predicts that people are more likely to attribute outcomes of events to
dispositional factors rather than to situational factors (Heider 1958). Dispositional
factors are internal factors associated with a person and situational factors are
outside the control of an individual.
Ability to
Forecast
Accuracy of
Earnings
Forecasts
Business
Risk

Figure 2. Factors Affecting Management Forecasts (From Davidson and Nue, 1993)

Two important dispositional factors discussed by Heider (1958) are
intention and ability. Intention is someone’s desire to do and act, and ability is the
individual’s power to take action. These constructs are similar in nature to the
expertise, trustworthiness, and intention factors of credibility. Expertise is a level
of ability. Intention is an external perception of someone’s desires, and
trustworthiness is the belief that someone will or will not attempt to act on his/her
desires. The components of credibility (expertise, trustworthiness, and intention)
are all dispositional factors. Therefore, attribution theory (Heider 1958; Kelley
1973; Reagan et al. 1974; Wood and Eagly 1981) suggests that investors would
blame management’s failure to forecast accurately on internal factors, absent an
external reason given for management’s failure. Investors may believe that a
22

missed forecast was due to such internal factors as management’s lack of
expertise in forecasting or management’s willingness to forecast accurately
(trustworthiness), thus reducing management’s credibility. Conversely, investors’
perceptions of management’s credibility increase when management’s prior
forecasting accuracy increases (Jennings 1987; Williams 1996; Hirst et al. 1999).
Williams (1996) found that analysts relied more upon current management
forecasts when management’s forecasts were more useful in the past.
Management’s forecasts were considered more useful if, in the past, the new
information management gave in its forecast was more accurate than the
analysts’ current estimates. For example, two firms could predict and achieve
their earnings per share at exactly the same amount of $4.00 per share.
However, if analysts for the two firms expected that earnings would be $3.75 and
$3.50, respectively, then management’s forecast was more useful in the case of
the firm with the $3.50 analysts’ expectation. The Williams (1996) study was
conducted using actual stock market forecast revisions made by analysts
following an actual disclosure from a publicly traded company. Analysts’ forecast
revisions were observed and management’s prior forecast accuracy was
measured based on management’s real prior forecasts. Since the study was
conducted using only archival data, there is no way to know if analysts actually
used management’s prior forecast accuracy when making their revisions.
As shown by the review of prior studies, management’s accuracy in prior
forecasting has a large impact on management’s credibility. The impact on
management’s credibility in turn impacts the amount of investor belief revision
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when management issues a forecast. In this study, two conditions of accuracy
will be used. In the first condition participants will have no knowledge of
management’s prior accuracy. In the second condition participants will not be told
of management’s accuracy but they will be given a prior forecast from
management that they will subsequently learn is inaccurate; thus, experiencing
the inaccuracy first hand.
2.2.6.2

Tone of Communications

There is anecdotal evidence that management’s tone in communicating
with investors can affect management’s perceived credibility with investors.
Articles in recent public relations journals tout strategies that say management
can increase or regain its credibility with investors by altering its tone in
communications with investors, such as the company’s annual report (Budd
2000; Calvey 2001; O'Brien 2001; Thompson 2002; Leckey 2003). At the same
time, investor publications tell investors they can learn about a company from the
tone a company takes in communicating with its shareholders (Rodgers 2002).
Most shareholders will never physically meet the management of the
companies in which they invest. Management’s communications to shareholders
are often the only direct contact shareholders have with a company. It would be
logical to assume that these written communications from management may be
the best opportunity management has to convey its goodwill (intentions) toward
investors. Thompson (2002) suggests that management can regain lost
credibility by issuing communications to investors that “shoot straight.” Could it
be this simple for management to regain some of its lost credibility?
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The intention of this study is to test management’s ability to increase its
rating of credibility by communicating its intention toward investors via a written
communication that conveys management’s understanding, empathy, and
responsiveness. In period one, half the participants will receive an altered
statement of internal control letter from management intended to convey its
understanding, empathy, and responsiveness (intentions) at a high level. The
treatment group receiving the high level letter will be referred to as the “high
intention” treatment while the other treatment will be referred to as the “no
intention” treatment. Participants who perceive that management has better
intentions toward them should rate management’s credibility higher than
participants without such a perception.5
Therefore, H1 states:
H1: Participants who receive an internal control letter from management
with a high intention tone will rate management’s credibility higher
than participants who are given an internal control letter with no
intention tone.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that participants will rate management’s credibility
higher after receiving the internal control letter from management seeded with a
high intention tone. Although McCroskey and Teven (1999) have already
established this link using the credibility scale, credibility is also known to impact
participants’ reliance on management’s forecasts. In accounting research,
management’s perceived credibility is measured by the amount of revision
participants make when receiving earnings guidance from management, ceteris
5

In period one of the study, only the intention variable of credibility has been manipulated in the
communication; therefore, no predictions are made regarding the expertise and trustworthy
factors of credibility.
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paribus (Patell 1976; King et al. 1990; Williams 1996; Hirst et al. 1999; Mercer
2001). Based on source credibility theory, higher perceived management
credibility yields a greater amount of reliance by participants on management’s
forecast. The greater the amount of reliance on management’s information the
more credible management is thought to be. Therefore, consistent with source
credibility theory, H2 predicts that participants who are given written
communications from management (management’s internal control letter in
period one of this study) with a high intention tone will perceive management as
having higher credibility, and thus will rely on management’s forecast by revising
their earnings per share predictions closer (greater revision) to management’s
predictions.6
H2: Participants who receive an internal control letter from management
with a high intention tone will rely more on management’s forecasts
by revising their earnings per share estimates closer to
management’s predictions than participants who receive an internal
control letter with no intention tone.

2.2.6.2

Tone of Communications versus Inaccurate Forecast

The intention factor of credibility has not heretofore been studied in a
judgment and decision-making setting. This study is designed to test the impact
of management’s tone in communications on management’s credibility, including
the intention factor, and then to test the ensuing effects on participants’ belief
revisions. It is expected that the results of period one will show that the tone
6

The treatment in period one is the tone of the communication by management to shareholders.
This tone is expected to impact the investors’ perception of management credibility. The letter
used in period one of this study (the statement on the effectiveness of internal controls) is not
expected to impact investor’s initial earnings per share estimates, only their perception of
management’s credibility, and therefore their future reliance on management’s forecasts.
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management has with participants can increase its credibility. What is not known
is whether that increase in credibility can substitute or outweigh the other two
factors of credibility: expertise and trustworthiness. In order to test whether the
different factors of credibility are substitutes for one another, the study will
manipulate management’s accuracy between a level where participants have no
knowledge of management’s past accuracy (period one) and a level where they
know management has forecasted inaccurately (period two). In period two of this
study all of the participants have had a previous experience with management in
which management failed to meet an earnings per share forecast. It is expected
that the participants will reduce their rating of management’s overall credibility,
including their rating of management’s expertise and trustworthiness. Participants
will receive a letter from management notifying them of management’s failure to
meet its earnings per share estimate. The tone of the letter will be manipulated at
two levels; one with a high intention tone and one with the no intention tone.
When management forecasts inaccurately, its credibility should drop and
participants should rely less on management’s forecast. But if management’s
tone in letters to shareholders increases its intention factor of credibility when
using a high intention tone, it should increase overall perceived credibility and
allow management to effectively persuade participants of management’s beliefs.
Therefore, H3 predicts that management’s tone in communications can
mitigate lost credibility ratings from failing to forecast accurately. Based on
source credibility theory, H4 predicts that management’s tone in communications
can also lead to greater reliance on future management forecasts.
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H3: Participants who receive an inaccurate forecast from management
and receive an earnings notification letter from management with a
high intention tone will not lower management’s credibility rating as
much as participants who receive an inaccurate forecast from
management and who are given an earnings notification letter from
management with no intention tone.
H4: Participants who are notified of an inaccurate forecast from
management by an earnings notification letter that conveys a high
intention tone will reduce the amount they rely on management’s
future forecasts less than participants who receive an earnings
notification letter from management conveying no intention tone.
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3.0 Research Method
3.1

Introduction
In Chapter 2 a theoretical model was developed and hypotheses were

proposed. This chapter details the testing of those hypotheses. A description of
the research design, including a description of the task and participants is
presented. The measured and manipulated variables in this study will then be
discussed. The measured variables include the dependent variables and the
covariates. The manipulated variables are the independent variables. Following
the discussion of the variables, a discussion of the three pilot studies that tested
the research materials is presented. The chapter ends with a discussion
regarding the overall findings from the pilot studies.
3.2 Research Design
All participants completed the task under both a condition of no prior
information about management’s forecast accuracy (period one) and under a
condition where participants had knowledge that management had previously
forecasted inaccurately (period two). The independent variable for all four
hypotheses is the tone of the communications. Tone is a between participant
factor (high intention and no intention) in both period one and period two. In
period one, tone is manipulated using the statement on internal control
effectiveness by management. In period two, tone is manipulated using a letter
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from management regarding actual earnings from period one. Four dependent
variables are measured in this study. In period one there are two dependent
variables; the rating of management’s credibility and participants’ reliance on
management’s forecasts. In period two of the study the same two pieces of
information are collected as in period one but the dependent variables are
constructed as the difference between the measured variables in period one and
period two. Therefore, the two dependent variables in period two are; 1) the
difference in management’s credibility rating, and 2) the difference in reliance on
management’s forecasts.
Management’s credibility rating is measured using a previously validated
18-question credibility scale (McCroskey and Teven 1999). In H1, the credibility
scores between the two treatment groups (high intention statement on internal
controls vs. no intention statement on internal controls) are compared. For H3,
the difference in credibility ratings (credibility in period two less credibility in
period one) between the two treatment groups (high intention earnings letter and
no intention earnings letter) is compared.
Participant reliance on management’s forecasts is a measure of the
percentage change participants make in their forecasts after receiving
management’s forecast. In H2 the percentage change in forecasts made by
participants from before to after management’s forecast is compared between
treatment groups (high intention statement on internal controls vs. no intention
statement on internal controls). For H4 the variable measured is the difference in
the percent change in forecasts made from period one to period two, which is
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compared between treatment groups (high intention earnings letter and no
intention earnings letter).
3.3 Task
An Internet-based laboratory experiment was conducted. The
experimental materials resided on a local Web site. Participants signed up for
scheduled experimental runs. A facilitator read the study’s instructions and
provided each of the participants with a computer disk. The disk contained a
hyperlink to the Web page, which randomized each participant into one of the
four treatments in the study.
The study’s task required participants to make earnings per share
estimates after reviewing the background and financial statements of a selected
company. Participants also rated management’s credibility using the McCroskey
and Teven (1999) scale.
The experimental task was adapted from prior research studies by Hirst et
al. (1999) and Mercer (2005). Task materials regarding the company, including
company background, products, and financial statements were directly adapted
from Mercer (2005). The task of predicting earnings per share was adapted from
Hirst, et al. (1999). Hirst, et al. (1999) used this task to study the joint effects of
management’s prior forecast accuracy and the form of a financial forecast on
participants’ judgments.
.
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Table 1: Overview of Steps in Study
1. General instructions about the study
2. Participant informed consent
3. Introduction to task
4. Study background information
5. Company background information
6. Overview of company products
7. Internal control letter
a. High intention
b. No intention
8. Financial statements (income statement and balance sheet)
9. Participants provide initial earnings per share estimate for period one
10. Participants are given management’s earnings per share estimate for period one
11. Participants revise their earnings per share estimate for period one
12. Participants complete the credibility rating for period one
a. Expertise factors
b. Intention factors
c. Trust factors
13. Participants are given the financial results letter for period one (with actual earnings per
share)
a. High intention version of letter
b. No intention version of letter
14. Company financial statements with period 1 actual results
15. Participants provide initial earnings per share estimate for period 2.
16. Participants are given management’s EPS prediction for period 2
17. Participants revise their earnings per share estimate for period 2
18. Participants complete the credibility ratings for period two
a. Expertise factors
b. Intention factors
c. Trust factors
19. Participants answer manipulation check questions
20. Participants answer covariate questions – fraud
21. Participants answer covariate questions – Sarbanes-Oxley
22. Participants answer demographic covariate questions
23. Participants answer possible covariate questions – prior investing experience
24. Participants answer theoretically derived covariate questions
25. Participants are allowed to provide feedback regarding their experience
26. Participants view the finished screen which thanks them for participating
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Table 1 provides an overview of the steps of the task. A step by step
progression of the study is presented in Appendix B with screen shots from the
study, including descriptions of each step required of the participants. The steps
referenced in this section refer to the corresponding steps in Table 1
Before they began the task, the participants read general instructions
(step 1) for the experiment and were given an informed consent form (step 2).
After participants elected to participate in the study (the informed consent), they
were given an introduction to the task and asked to assume the role of an
investor evaluating the subject company (step 3). They were then given a short
description of the company, its products, and the industry in which the company
operates (steps 4-6).
Participants were also given a management letter regarding the
company’s internal controls over financial reporting pursuant to PCAOB Auditing
Standard No. 2 (step 7). Half of the participants received this letter in a manner
that conveyed a message of high intention tone by management (step 7a). The
other half of the participants received the required letter without the intention tone
manipulation (step 7b). The participants then received three years of financial
statement data (step 8). The balance sheets and income statements were
identical for all treatment groups in stage one.
Participants were told they were looking at this information as of January 1
of the current year (period one). Once the participants had reviewed all of the
background material about the company (steps 4-6), the internal control letter at
either a high intention (step 7a) or no intention (step 7b), and the financial
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statements (step 8), they were asked to predict the company’s earnings per
share for the first year (step 9).
The participants were then given management’s earnings per share
forecast for period one (step 10). At this point in the study, none of the
participants had any knowledge of management’s past forecast accuracy and
were, therefore, in the no prior accuracy treatment. The prediction of earnings
per share made by management was automatically generated based on the
participant’s earnings per share prediction in step 9. The management forecast
was 132 percent higher than the participant’s response from step 9. After
receiving management’s forecast, participants were given a chance to adjust
their prediction of earnings per share for period one (step 11). The adjustment
made by participants is the dependent variable for H2, reliance on management
forecasts. The participants then completed the credibility measurement
instrument (step 12 a,b,c). The credibility measurement instrument is an 11-point
Likert scale with 18 questions designed to measure the three factors of
credibility: expertise (step 12a), intention (step 12b), and trustworthiness (step
12c). Credibility rating is the dependent variable for H1 in the study.
The participants were given a letter from management (step 13) that
notified participants of the actual results for the year (period one). Participants
were told the difference between what management predicted and actual results.
The letter stated that management failed to meet its prediction of earnings per
share by 17 percent (109 percent of the participant’s earnings per share). The
tone of the letter from management was determined by whether participants were
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in the high intention (13a) or no intention (13b) tone-of-the-financial-letter
treatment conditions. One half of the participants received in the letter a
statement that conveyed a message of high intentions by management (step
13a). The other half of the participants received a letter that only stated the
results for the year (period one) and the difference between what management
predicted and actual results (step 13b).
In the next stage of the study participants were given the financial income
statement that included the actual results for period one (step 14). The income
statement reflected the financial results the participants were told about in the
management letter (see step 13a or 13b). The participants were then asked to
make a prediction of earnings for the second year (period two) (step 15) for the
same company.
After making their earnings per share predictions for period two,
participants were given management’s earnings per share prediction for period
two (step 16). Management’s forecast was 132 percent higher than the prediction
made by the participants. After receiving management’s estimate, participants
were given an opportunity to revise their forecast for the second year (step 17).
Participant’s revised forecast for year two was used to calculate the dependent
variable for H4, difference in reliance on management’s forecast. After revising
their forecasted earnings per share, participants were asked to complete the
credibility measurement instrument for the second time (step 18a-c). The
credibility rating in period two was used to calculate the dependent variable for
H3, difference in credibility ratings.
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After finishing the main part of the study, the participants answered
several different types of questions including: manipulation check questions (step
19), covariate questions regarding fraud (step 20), covariate questions regarding
Sarbanes-Oxley (step 21), demographic questions (step 22), and other questions
that were included in the study to identify possible covariates based on the
participant’s past investing experiences (step 23) and theoretical models (step
24). Participants were also given a chance to provide feedback about the study
(step 25). Finally, participants were thanked for participating in the study and
asked not to discuss the study with others until they had been debriefed (step
26).
3.4 Participants
The participants for the main study are discussed in the Chapter 4. All
participants for the pilot studies were students, and are discussed, respectively,
with each pilot study.
3.5 Measured Variables
This section describes each of the independent variables, dependent
variables, and covariates that are captured and/or measured in this study.
3.5.1

Independent Variables
The independent variables for this study are forecast accuracy and

management’s tone in its letter to investors (participants). These variables are
discussed in the following sections. A third variable (surprise) will also be
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discussed, since it is theoretically important to the study; however, this variable is
held constant in the study.
3.5.1.1

Forecast Accuracy

Management’s forecast accuracy has been used as a proxy for
management’s credibility (Williams 1996; Hirst et al. 1999; Mercer 2001; Mercer
2005). In this study management’s forecast accuracy was manipulated at two
levels, no information and inaccurate information. In the no information condition
none of the participants had knowledge of management’s prior accuracy. The no
information condition occurs in period one of the task.
The inaccurate condition in this study occurs in period two. In period two,
all of the participants knew the earnings forecast from management in period one
was inaccurate. In prior studies, participants were only told that management
had been accurate or inaccurate (Hirst et al. 1999). In this study, the participants
are aware of management’s predictions in period one and the actual results of
period one.
A decision was made not to include a third level where participants know
that management has been accurate in forecasting. Prior studies have found that
when management’s prior accuracy is high investors perceive management’s
credibility as high and few other variables can increase management’s credibility
to a higher level (Hirst et al. 1999).7 The high accuracy variable level was
purposefully omitted from the study to reduce the size and complexity of the
study.
7

This finding may be the result of a ceiling effect.
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3.5.1.2

Management’s Tone

Management’s tone was manipulated at two different times during the
study. There are two levels of management’s tone manipulation; one is a high
intention tone and the second is a no intention tone. In the high intention
treatments, the wording in the letters was consistent with management displaying
the three sub-factors of the intention factor of credibility: understanding, empathy,
and responsiveness toward participants. The letters can be seen in Appendix B
(step 8 and 14).
The first tone manipulation between groups occurred in the letter from
management discussing the company’s internal controls over financial reporting,
as required by the PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 2. This letter was included with
the company’s background and historical financial statements. While the internal
control letter is required by the PCAOB, the exact wording of the letter has been
left to management. This study manipulates a single paragraph of this letter to
convey a high intention or no intention tone to participants.
The second tone manipulation is in the form of a letter from management
disclosing the actual earnings of the company for the prior year (period one) of
operations. Management’s tone is manipulated at two levels, high intention and
no intention.
3.5.1.3

Surprise

Surprise measures the difference between participants initial expectation
of earnings per share and management’s prediction of earnings per share. The
amount of surprise was set to 32 percent above participants’ initial prediction for
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all treatment conditions. To obtain a sufficient treatment effect, 32 percent was
selected based upon the results of pilot test one.
Although the surprise variable is held constant across treatment
conditions, it is an important variable in comparing this research model to prior
studies. Past studies have used proxies to measure the market’s initial level of
belief. In behavioral studies such as Hirst et al. (1999), participants were given
analysts’ consensus estimates as an initial level of belief and then asked to make
their estimates of earnings per share. While this method seems to give all
participants a similar anchor, the participants still have some prior belief. The
difference between participant’s prior level of belief and the anchor given to them
cannot be measured in those studies. In this study, the participants gave their
earnings per share estimate without being given any confounding anchors. The
treatments for the remainder of the study were then based on the participant’s
initial earnings per share estimates.
Basing the treatments on the participant’s initial level of belief eliminates
another type of potential bias. Studies that use a constant dollar amount for
surprise may introduce an unintended bias. If one participant’s initial level of
belief is $1.00 and management’s estimate is $1.50 the surprise is $.50, which is
a 50 percent increase over the initial level of belief. Another participant may
have an initial belief of $1.25 and when given management’s estimate of $1.50
he/she only has a 20 percent increase over the initial level of belief. In an attempt
to eliminate this bias, this study uses relative percentages, instead of incremental
adjustments measured in dollars.
39

3.5.2

Dependent Variables
The dependent variables for this study are management’s credibility rating

(H1), participants’ reliance on management’s forecasts (H2), the difference in
credibility ratings from period one to period two (H3), and the difference in
reliance on management’s forecast from period one to period two (H4). Each of
these variables is discussed below. Variables H1 and H3 are discussed first
followed by H2 and H4.
3.5.2.1

Management Credibility Rating (H1)

The first dependent variable captured in this study is management’s
credibility rating. The credibility rating was measured using the McCroskey and
Teven (1999) scale. The scale is located in Appendix B (steps 12a,b,c &
18a,b,c). Eighteen questions are used in the scale to determine participants’
perception of management’s credibility. The scale measures credibility along
three factors: (a) competence, (b) intention, and (c) trustworthiness.
Management’s credibility rating is reported as the average of all 18 scale
questions.
3.5.2.2

The Difference in Credibility Ratings (H3)

Participants were asked to complete the credibility scale twice. The first
time participants complete the scale is after revising their earnings per share
forecasts in period one. Participants were also asked to complete the scale after
revising their forecast in period two. The difference in credibility ratings measures
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the difference between participants’ ratings of management’s credibility from
period one to period two in the study.
3.5.2.3

Reliance on Management’s Forecast (H2)

Reliance on management’s forecast measures the difference between the
participants’ first earnings per share estimate and their revised earnings per
share estimate after receiving management’s forecast.
The participants are asked to forecast the earnings per share of the
company in period one based on the background financial data about the
company. They are then given management’s forecast of earnings per share for
the same time period. Management’s forecast will always be 132 percent of the
earnings prediction made by the participant. Participants are provided a chance
to modify their earnings per share estimate after receiving management’s
forecast.
Table 2, Panel A demonstrates the measurement of reliance on
management’s forecast. To measure the participant’s reliance on management’s
forecast, first the amount of surprise in management’s forecast is calculated. As
stated above, all participants make a forecast for period one (EPS1) and receive
a forecast from management (MEPS) that is 32 percent higher than the
participant’s initial earnings per share estimate. Thus, all participants have a
surprise of 32 percent of their initial forecast. Surprise is the denominator in the
calculation of reliance. As can be seen in Table 2, Panel A, a participant with an
initial earnings per share estimate of $2.00 is given information from
management with $.64 of surprise ([MEPS- EPS1] or [$2.00 * .32]).
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Table 2: Reliance on Management’s Forecast (H2) and Difference in Reliance on
Management’s Forecasts Calculations (H4)
Panel A: Reliance on Management’s Forecast (H2) as Measured by the Percentage
Change in Earnings Per Share Estimate
Revision
Surprise

=

EPS2 – EPS1
MEPS- EPS1

=

2.40 - 2.00
2.64 – 2.00

=

0.40
0.64

=

63%

Panel B: Difference in Reliance on Management’s Forecasts (H4)
Percentage Change in EPS Period One – Percentage Change in EPS Period Two*
63%
40%
Reliance dropped by 23%
EPS1: Initial earnings per share estimate made by participant.
EPS2: Revised earnings per share estimate made by participant
MEPS: Management's estimate of earnings per share for period
* The reliance on management’s forecast for period two is calculated exactly as the
reliance on management’s forecast for period one. H4 only uses the difference between the
two reliance measures; no hypothesis was made for the reliance on management’s forecast
in period two.

Once the amount of management’s surprise is calculated, the amount of
revision in the participant’s forecasts is calculated. The revision in a participant’s
forecast is calculated by subtracting the initial earnings per share estimate
(EPS1) from the revised earnings per share estimate (EPS2). For example, in
Table 2, Panel A, the initial earnings per share estimate is $2.00 and the revised
earnings per share estimate is $2.40. Thus, the revision in earnings per share is
$.40.
After the revision and the surprise have been calculated, the revision is
divided by the surprise to determine what percentage of management’s new
information was relied upon in revising the participant’s earnings forecast. In the
example in Table 2, Panel A the revision of $.40 was divided by the surprise of
$.64. In the example, the participant made a 63 percent adjustment to
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management’s new information. If the participant had revised his/her earnings
per share estimates to $2.64, reliance on management’s forecast would have
been 100 percent.
3.5.2.4

Difference in Reliance on Management’s Forecast (H4)

To calculate the difference in reliance on management’s forecasts (H4),
the reliance on management’s forecast is measured twice in this study, once in
period one and once in period two. So that reliance can be measured in period
two, participants will be asked to give an earnings-per-share prediction for period
two. As in period one, participants will be given management’s forecast of
earnings per share for period two, which will again be 32 percent higher than
participants’ estimates. After receiving management’s earnings per share
forecast for period two, participants will be given a chance to modify their
forecast. Panel A of Table 2 provided a demonstration of how the reliance on
management’s forecast is calculated in period one. The reliance on
management’s forecast in period two is calculated the same way. No hypotheses
are given regarding the reliance on management’s forecast in period two, instead
this study examines the difference in reliance on management’s forecasts (H4)
by subtracting the period one reliance measure from the period two reliance
measure. Panel B of Table 2 demonstrates this calculation using the numbers
for period one as calculated in Panel A. Assume in period two the participant
had a reliance on management’s forecast of 40 percent. Therefore, the difference
in reliance on management’s forecasts is 23 percent (63 percent – 40 percent).
This signifies a 23 percent drop in reliance.
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3.5.2.5

Covariates

Data about possible covariates were captured and tested. A thorough
discussion of the covariates measured and tested in this study appears in
Chapter 4. The task in this study required participants to review financial
statements and forecast earnings per share estimates. The covariates discussed
in Chapter 4 include the participants’ prior experience with financial statements or
forecasting, their level of investing activity, their background (major), and gender.
Other possible covariates were theoretically derived from persuasion studies and
are discussed in both Chapter 4 and Appendix A (O'Keefe 1990).
3.6 Pilot Studies
Before the main study was run, three separate pilot studies were
conducted. Two pilot studies were used to design and test some of the
experimental treatments used in the study. The third pilot test was conducted to
test the overall research instrument and the effect of the treatments on the
dependent variables.
3.6.1 Pilot Study One
The first pilot study was designed to test the level of surprise necessary to
generate a sufficient size effect. The pilot study was conducted using 19
students enrolled in an accounting information systems course at a large
southeastern university. Each participant was given four treatments which were
comprised of different statements regarding differences between management
and analysts’ forecasts. They were then asked to use a seven-point Likert scale
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to rate the difference between analysts’ forecasts and management’s as to the
significance of the difference and how surprising they found the difference.
Neither significance nor surprise was defined for participants. Both terms
(significant and surprising) were selected to determine how large management’s
earnings per share estimate would have to be to create a perceived significant
difference. Participants were asked if they felt the difference between
management’s forecast and the analysts’ forecasts was significant and then were
allowed to draw their own conclusion. Appendix C contains the complete
questionnaire used in pilot study one.
A decision was made to use analysts’ forecasts in the experimental
materials because participants were not given background data regarding the
company or financial statements. Additionally, it would not be feasible to tell the
participants what their forecast was and use that as a proxy for their true beliefs.
Instead, analysts’ forecasts were used to examine the amount of difference
needed between a believable external forecast and management’s forecast.
Management’s forecast varied between the four treatments as did the
percentage of surprise (Table 3). Forecasts were set at four different dollar
amounts with the surprise varying for each amount. The dollar amounts and the
surprise are indicated in Table 3:
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Table 3: Pilot Study One Surprise Analysis

Management’s
Forecast
$1.23
$1.55
$1.75
$1.10

Percentage of
Surprise
10%
20%
30%
40%

Analyst
Forecast
$1.35
$1.86
$2.27
$1.54

Difference
$0.12
$0.31
$0.53
$0.44

The dollar amount of management’s forecasts and the percentage of
surprise were arbitrarily selected to determine an approximate percentage at
which participants would feel there was a significant difference between
management’s forecast and the analysts’ forecasts. The amount of
management’s forecast increases over the first three treatments, up to $1.75,
and in the fourth treatment the amount of the forecast decreases to $1.10. This
was done to examine whether the surprise was being generated by the dollar
amount of the difference or by the percentage difference.
An ANOVA was performed to determine if the changes in the difference
between management’s forecast and the analyst’s forecast had an effect on
participants’ ratings of surprise and significance on the seven-point Likert scale.
Overall, the change in percentage differences was significantly associated with
surprise (F=11.52, two-tailed p =.001) and significance (F= 10.23, two-tailed p=
.001). Table 4 presents the means and standard deviations of the surprise and
significance questions for each of the treatments.
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Table 4: Means and Standard Deviation for the Seven-point Likert Scale Ratings of
Surprise and Significance

Treatment

N

Surprise Mean
(Standard Deviation)

Significance Mean (Standard
Deviation)

10%
19
3.263 (1.147)
4.368
20%
19
4.000 (1.105)
5.526
30%
19
5.526 (1.218)
6.368
40%
19
4.947 (1.615)
5.894
Scale end points were 1 = Insignificant to 7 = Significant

(1.383)
(1.172)
(0.831)
(1.197)

A Scheffe’s test was used to determine if there was a significant difference
between the treatment groups. For the significance variable, the 10 percent
group was significantly different from all other treatments. No other significant
differences were found. For the surprise variable, there were no significant
differences among groups. The lack of significant differences among treatment
groups may have been due to the design of the instrument. The 40 percent
treatment resulted in a lower dollar difference than the 30 percent treatment.
Therefore, the results were re-computed eliminating the 40 percent treatment. In
this analysis, the 30 percent treatment was significantly different from the
remaining two groups for both measures.
After consideration of the results of this pilot study, 32 percent 8 was
selected as the difference between participants’ initial forecast and
management’s forecast for the main pilot study (pilot study 3).

8

Although 30% was the amount tested, 32% was used to limit participant’s ability to guess that
management’s forecast was a percentage of theirs. If participants predicted an even number like
$1.00, they may figure out by period two that management’s prediction is exactly 30% larger.
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For the purposes of this study it was important to have surprise between
management’s forecast and participants’ prior expectations. There is no correct
amount of surprise. All of the participants in the main study got the same
percentage of surprise. The difference between treatments was examined using
a percentage calculation of change.
3.6.2 Pilot Study Two
The second pilot study was conducted to examine the power of the tone
manipulations on participants’ ratings of management’s intention factor of
credibility. As previously discussed, there are two separate tone manipulations in
the study, each at two levels. One of the tone manipulations occurs in
management’s statement about the company’s internal controls, as mandated by
the PCAOB Standard No. 2. The second tone manipulation occurs in a letter
from management discussing the disappointing results from the prior year (period
one).
Twenty-one students were given management’s internal control letter and
a letter from management stating the prior year’s financial results. They were
also given the six questions from the credibility scale measuring perceived
intention (Appendix B, step 13b). There were two versions of each letter, one
with a high intention tone and one with no intention tone. Each student received
only a single instance of each letter. For example, a single student could have
received an internal control letter with the high intention tone and a financial
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results letter with the no intention tone. There were four possible groups and the
order in which students were assigned to each group was random.9
For the internal control letter credibility ratings a MANOVA was conducted
using the six credibility rating questions as the dependent variables and the tone
manipulation as the independent variable. An overall MANOVA F-test indicated a
significant difference in the rating of management’s credibility between
participants in the high intention tone and no intention tone groups (F=3.73; twotailed p= .020). Not all six of the questions measuring perceived intention were
significant. A breakdown of the individual ANOVA results for each question is
presented in Panel A of Table 5. The two items measuring perceived intentions
that were not statistically significant were self-centered and understanding.
For the earnings results letter credibility ratings a MANOVA was
conducted using the six credibility rating questions as the dependent variables
and the tone manipulation as the independent variable. An overall MANOVA Ftest indicated no significant difference in the ratings of management’s credibility
between participants in the high intention and no intention tone groups (F=.84;
two-tailed p=.556). All six items were insignificant when analyzed using
ANOVAs. The results are presented in Panel B of Table 5.
The overall results of the second pilot study indicated that the right wording
in a letter from management could influence participants’ perceptions and ratings
of management’s credibility. With respect to the earnings letter, the manipulation

9

The order the letters were presented was not random because the order of these letters cannot
be randomized in the main study. All participants receive the internal control letter before
receiving the financial results letter.
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was not sufficiently strong, or was not important to participants, as there was no
statistically significant difference between the two groups. Before the main pilot
study was conducted, the wording of the earnings letter was revised. Both the
high intention tone and no intention tone earnings letters were lengthened10.

10

Ph.D. students were asked to analyze the letters used in pilot study two and to make
recommendations for increasing the impact of the letters.
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Table 5: Comparison of Statistics for Management’s Internal Control Letter and Earnings Letter
Panel A: MANOVA Results of the Management Internal Control Letter on Six Intention Questions (Wilks’ Lambda 0.384; MANOVA
F=3.73; p=.020)
High Intention Treatment
No Intention Treatment
Upper Bound (1)

Lower Bound (11)

Cares about me

Doesn’t care about me

Mean (standard deviation)
4.818 (1.078)

Mean (standard deviation)
3.600 (1.429)

F Stat
4.92

P-value
0.039

Has my interest at heart

Does not have my interest at heart.

4.727 (0.904)

3.400 (1.712)

5.07

0.036

Not self-centered

Self-centered

4.545 (1.128)

3.800 (1.229)

2.10

0.163

Concerned with me

Unconcerned with me

5.272 (0.646)

3.700 (1.337)

12.14

0.003

Sensitive

Insensitive

5.181 (0.603)

4.400 (1.699)

7.57

0.013

Understanding

Not Understanding

5.181 (0.751)

4.800 (0.788)

1.29

0.270

Panel B: MANOVA Results of the Earnings Results Letter on Six Intention Questions (Wilks’ Lambda 0.734; MANOVA F=.84; p=.556)

High Intention Treatment

No Intention Treatment

Mean (standard deviation)

Mean (standard deviation)

Upper Bound (1)

Lower Bound (11)

Cares about me

Doesn’t care about me

4.181 (1.887)

3.900 (1.524)

0.14

0.713

Has my interest at heart

Does not have my interest at heart.

4.272 (1.272)

4.000 (1.633)

0.18

0.673

Not self-centered

Self-centered

4.363 (1.362)

4.400 (1.712)

0.00

0.957

Concerned with me

Unconcerned with me

4.727 (1.737)

4.000 (1.764)

0.09

0.354

Sensitive

Insensitive

4.454 (1.293)

4.400 (1.265)

0.01

0.923

Understanding

Not Understanding

4.818 (1.28)

4.300 (1.159)

0.90

0.355

* All questions begin with the phrase “I believe that management of MBMC, Inc.

…”
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F Stat

P-value

3.6.3 Main Pilot Study
A third pilot study was conducted to test the overall effectiveness of the
research instrument and to test the main effects of the treatments on the
dependent variables. Student participants enrolled in the study online and
completed the task at their own pace via the Internet. Originally, 33 usable
responses were tested.11 Participants were solicited from two accounting
classes. One of the classes had participated in the second pilot study.
Participants from this class previously read the letters. There is a possibility that
the students in this class did not re-read the letters, as they may have believed
they already knew what the letters said. Their responses were a potential threat
to the internal validity of the study. Data for participants who had previously
participated in the second pilot study were removed and 19 overall responses
were used to analyze the pilot data. Students who were retained in the study
were senior level accounting students enrolled in an Auditing II course.
In the main pilot study, participants were asked to pretend they were
members of an investment club. They were given background information about
a fictitious company. Included in this information was the internal control letter
(manipulated at two levels: high intention tone and no intention tone) and
financial data for the last three years, including the earnings per share
information. Participants were asked to estimate earnings per share for the
coming year (period one). Participants were then given management’s earnings
per share estimate for the same period (set at 132 percent of the participant’s
11

Two responses were eliminated because of missing or incomplete information. Several
students lost connection of the host Web site but re-started the instrument and completed it in full.
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initial prediction) and then were given an opportunity to alter their original
estimate. After completing the earnings per share estimate, participants
completed the credibility scale.
In the second part of the main pilot study, participants were notified of the
actual earnings per share for period one. Notification came in the form of a letter
from management that was also manipulated at two levels (high intention and no
intention). Participants were notified that management had failed to meet its
forecast. The amount of difference between actual earnings per share in period
one and management’s prediction was held as a constant percentage of
management’s prediction (equivalently stated as 109 percent of the participants’
original estimate or approximately 17.4 percent less than management’s initial
estimate). Thus, although the absolute dollar amount of difference between
management’s forecast and the actual results varied between participants, the
percentage difference remained constant.
Participants were again presented with the financial statements, including
the most recent year’s performance. They were asked to estimate earnings per
share. Participants were given management’s prediction of earnings per share
for the year (period two) (132 percent of their estimate) and given the opportunity
to revise their forecast. Participants then completed the credibility instrument as
well as manipulation check questions and demographic questions. Appendix B
contains screen shots of the experiment as it was presented to the participants.
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3.6.3.1

Main Pilot Study Data Analysis

The data collected in the pilot study were analyzed to determine if the
treatments (the letters) had an effect on participants’ judgments. The main study
is based on four hypotheses. Recall that H1 and H2 predict that users who are
given communications from management with the high intention tone will rate
management’s credibility higher and have more reliance on management’s
forecasts. In period two, H3 and H4 predict that communications from
management with the high intention tone can mitigate other losses of credibility.
In the main study this was measured as the difference in credibility ratings from
period one to period two and as the difference in reliance on management
forecasts from period one to period two. For the pilot study only participant’s
ratings of credibility and their adjustment of earnings per share for period two
were compared between groups.
The pilot study was designed to test the effect of the treatments; however,
due to the small sample size, statistically significant results were not expected in
all treatments. Instead the strength and direction of the difference in means
between treatments was analyzed. The main effects results from the pilot study
are presented in Table 6 and Table 7.
Only the six questions that measure the intention factor of credibility were
analyzed for both letters. While overall management credibility is important, the
model already lacks statistical power, adding twelve more questions/variables to
test the impact of the letters on the expertise and trustworthy variables would
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lower the statistical power of the analysis.12 Also, the intention factor of credibility
is the primary factor that is manipulated in the study; whereas, the expertise and
trustworthy factors are not manipulated.
3.6.3.2

The Effects of the Internal Control Letter Manipulation

For the first year’s ratings and predictions, the overall model was tested
using the tone of the internal control letter participants received as the
independent variable, the six intention factor of credibility questions and the
percentage change in earnings per share estimates as the dependent variables.
The model was significant (F=5.31, two-tailed p= .008) as seen on Table 6 Panel
A.
As Table 6 Panel B shows, three of the intention questions are statistically
significant (cares about me [F=4.25, one-tailed p= .027], concerned with me
[F=4.42, one-tailed p= .025]), and has my interest at heart [F=2.51, one-tailed p=
.066]. The other three questions were found to be insignificant (not self centered
[F=.300, one-tailed p= .294], sensitive [F=.12, one-tailed p= .368], and
understanding [F=.01, one-tailed p= .454]). Interestingly, the three insignificant
variables were the only three questions on the instrument that were reverse
coded. It is possible that participants failed to read the questions carefully.
.

12

Overall credibility is composed of the three major factors of credibility (intention, expertise, and
trustworthiness) as measured by the 18 questions on the credibility scale. Each major factor is
measured by 6 of the 18 questions.
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Table 6: Main Pilot Study Results for Sarbanes-Oxley Internal Control Letter
Panel A: Overall Significance of Sarbanes Oxley Internal Control Letter: Wilks’ Lambda =.234, F= 5.31, p=.008
Panel B: Impact of Sarbanes Oxley Internal Control Letter on Intention Factor of Credibility Ratings

Question Description*
More Credibility (1)
Cares about me
Has my interest at heart
Not self-centered
Concerned with me
Sensitive
Understanding

Less Credibility (11)
Doesn’t care about me
Does not have my interest
at heart.
Self-centered
Unconcerned with me
Insensitive
Not Understanding

High Intention Tone (N=10)
Mean
(standard deviation)
5.200 (1.398)

No Intention Tone
(N=9)
Mean
(standard deviation)
6.777 (1.92)

F Statistic
4.25

P-value***
.027

5.500 (2.461)
6.900 (2.182)
5.500 (1.841)
5.400 (1.646)
5.100 (1.449)

7.111 (1.922)
6.333 (2.291)
7.222 (1.716)
5.666 (1.732)
5.000 (2.179)

2.51
.30
4.42
.12
.01

.066
.294
.025
.368
.454

F Statistic
2.22

P-value ***
.077

Panel C: Impact of Sarbanes Oxley Internal Control Letter on Percentage Change in Calculation

Variable
Y1PERDIF**

High Intention Tone (N=10)
Mean
(Standard Deviation)
.550 (.443)

No Intention Tone
(N=9)
Mean
(Standard Deviation)
.287 (.320)

*All questions begin with the phrase “I believe that management of MBMC, Inc”
** Y1PERDIF: Measures the percentage change in adjustment toward management’s forecast.
*** Two tailed p-values
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The reliance on management’s forecast was calculated as demonstrated
in Table 2 and was compared between the two treatment groups. Table 6 Panel
C, shows that participants in the high intention condition relied more on
management’s estimates. The mean percentage adjustment for participants in
the high intention condition was .550 compared to .287 for participants in the no
intention condition. The percentage of difference between means was statistically
significant (F=2.22, two-tailed p= .077) and in the direction expected.
3.6.3.3

The Effect of the Earnings Letter Manipulation

The second part of the pilot study sought to lower management’s
credibility by having management fail to meet the forecast from period one. The
study sought to determine whether a high intention tone letter from management
to shareholders could mitigate the loss of credibility as measured by the
difference in credibility ratings and by the difference in participants’ reliance on
management’s forecast. All participants were given a forecast from management
in period one that was inaccurate. In this part of the study, the number of
possible treatments has now doubled and the power of the statistical tests is
further reduced. Approximately 3-6 participants were in each treatment cell.
Table 7 presents the results of the earnings letter manipulation.

57

Table 7: The Results of the Main Pilot Study for the Earnings Results Letter
Panel A: Overall Significance of Earnings Results Letter: Wilks’ Lambda =.791, F= .053, p=.772
Panel B: Impact of Earnings Results Letter on Intention Factor of Credibility Ratings
Question Description*
More Credibility (1)
Cares about me
Has my interest at heart
Not self-centered
Concerned with me
Sensitive
Understanding

Less Credibility (11)
Doesn’t care about me
Does not have my interest
at heart.
Self-centered
Unconcerned with me
Insensitive
Not Understanding

High Intention Tone (N=10)
Mean
(standard deviation)
6.375 (1.767)

No Intention Tone (N=9)
Mean
(standard deviation)
6.182 (1.834)

F Statistic
.05

6.000 (2.000)
6.750 (2.251)
6.000 (2.449)
5.875 (1.642)
5.500 (1.069)

6.818 (2.088)
6.364 (2.292)
6.272 (1.794)
5.364 (2.292)
5.273 (2.240)

.74
.13
.08
.29
.07

No Intention Tone (N=9)
Mean
(Standard Deviation)
.058 (.188)

F Statistic
1.77

P-value
.821
.403
.719
.782
.598
.795

Panel C: Impact of Earnings Results Letter on Percentage Change in Calculation

Variable
Y2PERAJDF**

High Intention Tone (N=10)
Mean
(Standard Deviation)
.260 (.457)

*All questions begin with the phrase “I believe that management of MBMC, Inc”
** Y2PERADJ: Measures the percentage change in adjustment toward management’s forecast.
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P-value
.201

Table 7 Panel A presents the results of a MANOVA test on the earnings
letter manipulation. There was no overall significance found (F=.053, two-tailed
p=.772) when the main effect of the earnings letter treatment was tested against
the six intention factors of credibility and the adjustment of earnings per share
estimates. All six-intention factors of credibility were statistically insignificant
(cares about me [F=.05, two-tailed p= .821], has my interest at heart [F=.74, twotailed p= .403], not self centered [F=.13, two-tailed p= .719], concerned with me
F=.08, two-tailed p= .782], sensitive [F=.29, two-tailed p= .598], and
understanding [F=.07, two-tailed p= .795]).
Table 7 Panel C presents the results of testing the impact of the earnings
letter on the participants’ adjustment of earnings per share. This was also
insignificant (F=1.77, two-tailed p= .201); however, the means were in the
predicted direction, suggesting that participants in the high intention treatment
revised their earnings per share closer to management’s predictions. As shown
in Table 7 Panel C, the mean adjustment, stated as a percentage between
participants’ initial prediction and management’s prediction, was 26 percent for
the high intention treatment and 5.8 percent for the no intention treatment.
3.6.3.4

Comparison of Earnings Per Share Adjustments Between Groups

To compare the degree to which perceived credibility decreased between
period one and period two the difference in intention ratings and adjustments of
earnings per share were compared between treatment groups. In making the
comparison, two new dependent variables were calculated and analyzed from
the collected data. These variables measure the difference of adjustment in
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earnings per share estimates in period one and period two and the difference in
the intention factor of credibility ratings in period one and period two.
The first new variable is the difference between the average intention
ratings from period one and the average intention ratings from period two. The
six questions measuring the intention factor of credibility were summed and
averaged for each period. Period two average ratings were then subtracted from
the period one average ratings. For this variable, lower values indicate the
intention factor of credibility dropped more in period two (less credibility). Panel A
of Table 8 shows the mean ratings for period one and period two and the
difference between them. As indicated in Panel A, participants who received the
high intention earnings letter lowered management’s credibility more (-1.88) than
participants who received the no intention financial results letter (-.045).
The second new variable measures reliance on management’s forecast as
the difference between the percentage adjustment in earnings per share for
period one and period two. Table 2 demonstrated how this variable is calculated.
Panel B of Table 8 compares the mean loss of credibility for the percentage
change loss of credibility from period one to period two. Consistent with the
predicted findings, participants who received the high intention tone earnings
letter perceived less loss of credibility (.213) than participants who received the
no intention financial results letter (.332).
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Table 8: Reduction in Credibility Between Periods One and Two
Panel A: Decrease in the Intention Factor of Credibility from Period One to Period Two
Change in Intention Factor of Credibility by Treatment
Treatment Condition
High Intention Letter
No Intention Letter

N
8
11

Mean Period
One Rating
5.900
6.000

Mean Period
Two Rating
6.083
6.045

Mean Loss
of Credibility
-.188
-.045

Standard
Deviation
1.18
0.98

Panel B: Decrease in Percentage Change of Earnings Per Share Estimates From Period
One to Period Two

Treatment Condition
High Intention Letter
No Intention Letter

3.6.3.5

N
8
11

Percentage Change Loss by Treatment
Mean Period
Mean Period
One %
Two %
Mean Loss
Standard
Adjustment
Adjustment
of Credibility Deviation
.473
.260
.213
.431
.390
.058
.332
.421

Main Pilot Study Conclusions

While the results of the main pilot study do not offer significant statistical
relationships, the power of the statistical tests performed was low. Low power
increases the possibility of a Type II error. Overall, the results of the pilot study
were encouraging in that many of the manipulations seemed to be influencing the
dependent variables in the hypothesized direction.
Several other factors could also lead to the non-significant findings of this
pilot study. First the position of the credibility instrument in the study may have
been too far removed from the letter manipulations in both treatments. In the pilot
study, participants read the letter (the treatment) then read the financial
statements, made their earnings per share estimates, read management’s
earnings per share predictions, and then revised their forecasts before
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completing the credibility questions. For the main study this instrument was
moved up so that participants completed the credibility scale directly after
reading the letters.
Another significant factor that may have impacted the results of the pilot
study was the way in which the study was administered. Participants were able to
participate in the study at their leisure and in the location they selected. Some
participants may have had extraneous activities interfering with their attention to
the study and its subtle manipulations. The only variable available to give an
estimate of effort while taking the study is the time it took participants to complete
the study. This is a noisy variable in that someone who takes a long time to
complete the study may not have given any more effort to reading and answering
the questions than someone who took a short time. People or things around
participants could distract them from the study for a few minutes. In an effort to
help control these extraneous variables, the main study was conducted in a
supervised setting. The participants completed the study in a computer lab with a
proctor administering the study.
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4.0 Main Study Results
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I present the results of the main study. The task used in
the study was presented in Chapter 3, Section 3.3. This chapter begins with a
discussion of the main study’s participants. Next the manipulation checks
employed to ascertain the salience of the treatments to the participants are
discussed. After discussing the manipulation checks, an analysis of potential
covariates is presented. Following analysis of covariates, the hypotheses that
were presented in Chapter 2 are statistically tested and analyzed. Using the
results of the data analyses, each of the hypotheses is examined and discussed
in detail.
4.2 Participants
One hundred and twenty-four graduate level students participated in the
study. The participants were recruited from a large southeastern university. The
recruitment pool consisted of graduate students enrolled either in a Masters of
Business Administration (MBA) program, Masters of Accountancy (M.Acc.)
program or post-undergraduate accounting students who were completing a fifth
year of course work for professional certification. Forty-five MBA students and
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79 accounting students13 participated in the main study. There were 71 female
participants and 53 male participants. The participants had an average of 1.65
years of work experience in the field of accounting.
During the semester, all of the participants were enrolled in an accounting
course that required them to either participate in one of several available
research projects or write a paper assigned by their instructor. In addition to class
credit, participants who enrolled in this study were paid $10.
The participants in this study represented an appropriate pool to test the
research hypotheses since graduate business students have been found to be a
reasonable proxy for investors (Copeland et al. 1973; Ashton and Kramer 1980;
Walters-York and Curatola 1998; ,2000; Libby et al. 2002). Also, this study
focused on the judgment of investors and relied only on general cognitive
abilities. As discussed in Libby et al. (2002), students are a suitable participant
pool when general cognitive abilities are required. This study only looks at the
relative differences between participants’ responses by treatment group.
4.3 Manipulation Checks
Several manipulation check questions were included in the study to
determine if the participants perceived the treatments given to them. The
manipulation check questions will be discussed below.

13

A breakdown between M.Acc. students and the other accounting students was not made as
students in the M.Acc. program were also enrolled in the fifth year accounting course.
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4.3.1 Intention Manipulation
No manipulation check was analyzed with respect to the intention
manipulation. As discussed below, there were questions included in the study
that attempted to test if participant’s perceived the intention of the
communications that they were given.
Written communication was used to deliver the credibility treatment
between the groups in period one and period two. In period one, participants
received the statement of internal controls from management with either the high
intention tone or the no intention tone treatment. In period two, participants
received the letter from management informing them of the actual results for
period one, again with either a high intention tone or no intention tone treatment.
The intention factor of credibility is composed of three sub-factors:
understanding, empathy, and responsiveness. An attempt was made to
determine if the participants perceived the letters as understanding, empathetic,
and responsive. For each period, participants answered three questions rating
management on the three sub-factors of the intention factor of credibility. The
manipulation check questions can be seen in Appendix B, item 19.
The six manipulation check questions (three per period) dealing with the
three factors of credibility were not analyzed for this study. It was decided post
hoc that the credibility scale would be a better determinant than the manipulation
questions in determining if the participants perceived the letters as credible. The
purpose of the manipulation check questions was to test if the participants
remembered the treatment to which they were exposed. These manipulation
questions asked participants to rate the credibility of the letters they received, but
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did not ask about the actual wording of any of the letters. All three of the
manipulation questions were highly correlated with the credibility factors and
seemed to measure the same construct as credibility, which is already measured
by the credibility scale used in this study (Cronbach’s = .768). McCroskey and
Tevens’ (1999) credibility scale is a validated instrument, while the questions
used as manipulation checks have not been validated. Better manipulation
check questions could have asked the participants questions about the specific
wording in the letters they received such as, “Did management meet with focus
groups of shareholders because there was a directive from the board of
directors?” This type of question would have determined if the participants
actively recalled the specific treatments.
4.3.2 Surprise
Two manipulation questions were given to participants to determine if they
were surprised by the amount of management’s forecast. One question was used
for each of management’s forecasts. The questions were answered using a
seven-point Likert scale with answers ranging from “Lower than I expected” to
“Much more than I expected.” All but two of the participants seemed somewhat
surprised by management’s forecast. These participants rated the surprise of
management’s period one forecast as less than a four on the seven-point scale.
The period one analysis was conducted with and without these two participants
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and no material differences were found in the results. Based on these findings
the reported results retain the two participants.
Surprise was tested for the second period forecast in the same manner as
for period one. In period two, only one participant rated management’s forecast
as less than four on the seven-point scale. The analysis was conducted both with
and without the three participants who failed the manipulation check (two from
period one and one from period two) and there was no impact on the results of
the study.
4.3.3 Accuracy
One question was used as a manipulation check to determine whether
participants had perceived management’s period one forecast as accurate. The
question used a seven-point Likert scale and asked participants if management’s
forecast for period one was accurate (1) to inaccurate (7). Management’s
forecasts in the study were inaccurate and it was expected that participants
would rate management low on the accuracy scale. Six participants rated
management’s accuracy in its period one forecast below four on the seven-point
scale. Three participants answered the accuracy question with a rating of two
while three others had a rating of three. The reported results for period one’s
analyses and period two’s analyses were tested without these six responses and
no material differences were found.

67

4.3.4 Manipulation Check Summary
As indicated, it was determined that removing the participants who failed
manipulation check questions did not significantly add to the explanatory power
of the model. By keeping all of the participant responses a balanced design was
achieved, which increased the power of the statistical methods employed in the
data analysis.
4.4 Data Analysis
4.4.1 Introduction
This section begins with an explanation of the selection of covariates
included in the study. Following the discussion of the covariates, each of the
hypotheses will be discussed and statistically tested. Included in the write-up
about hypotheses testing is a description of the type of analysis used to test each
hypothesis.
4.4.2 Covariates
This study was designed to manipulate and measure management’s
perceived credibility by altering the tone of a written communication from
management. Management’s credibility was also manipulated in the study by
having management fail to meet a forecast. These manipulations were
purposeful and controlled in the experiment. There are, however, other factors
that can impact perceptions of management’s credibility or the impact that
perceptions of management’s credibility will have on decision making. While
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these factors are important, not all of them can be manipulated and randomized
between participants. Some of these factors are unique to each individual in the
study. It is important to identify and measure factors that are associated with
individual participants that may impact their assessment of management’s
credibility or the impact that management’s credibility has on their decision
making. In statistical terms, these factors are called covariates.
Good covariates will help explain some of the variation in the dependent
variables without removing any of the power of the model. Generally, good
covariates are highly correlated with the dependent variable but not with
independent variables. If the covariates are correlated with independent variables
they reduce the ability to measure the true impact of the independent variables
on the dependent variable. All covariates in this study were selected by first
testing a correlated relationship between the covariate and the dependent
variable. As the models are developed and tested, these covariates are further
scrutinized with regard to their relationship to the dependent variables. In the
case of the credibility rating variable, the potential covariates were tested
individually against the three sub-factors of the credibility variable. The subfactors were used to ensure that no potential covariates were omitted at a higher
level of analysis since the credibility construct is analyzed by the three subfactors in the post hoc analysis section.
Three types of possible covariates were measured and tested in this
study: demographic, theoretical, and recent events covariates. Covariates were
first tested by using a correlation analysis testing each covariate with the
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respective dependent variables. An alpha of .10 was used as the significance
level in the correlation analysis. Once the covariates with a significant correlation
to the dependent variable were identified, a preliminary ANCOVA model was
tested using the covariates and the appropriate independent variable. The
following sections detail the testing of the different classifications of possible
covariates used in this study.
4.4.2.1

Demographic Covariates

Demographic information was captured about each participant. Capturing
demographic information allows testing to determine if there were systematic
differences between similar groups of people participating in the study. The
demographic questions tested as covariates in this study are presented in Table
9 and include gender, accounting experience, and years of work experience.
Gender was selected as a possible covariate because prior research has found
significant differences between males and females in stock market investing
tasks (Barber and Odean 2001). This study makes no directional predictions as
to the impact of gender on the task results. Accounting experience and years of
work experience were selected as covariates due to the nature of the task. There
was a potential for participants with more accounting and work experience to
recognize differences between their experience with disclosures from
management and those presented within the task in the study.
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Table 9: Demographic Covariate Questions
Panel A: Variable Names, Questions and Response Format
Variable

Question

Response

Gender
Accounting
Experience
Years of
Experience

What is your gender?

Male=1/Female=0

Have you worked in the field of accounting?
In total, how many years have you worked in the field of
accounting?

Yes=1/No=0
(Numeric Response)

Panel B: Demographic Covariates Descriptive Data
Variable

N

Mean

Gender

124

0.427

Accounting Experience

124

0.508

Years of Experience

63

3.253

Panel C: Covariate Correlations with Dependent Variables Using Pearson Correlation
Coefficients (p-values**)
Difference in
Reliance on
Credibility Rating
Difference in
Reliance on
Management’s
Credibility Ratings
Management’s
Forecast
Variable*
Forecast
(0.050)
Gender
-0.177
-0.093
Accounting
Experience
0.109
(0.227)
-0.014
Years of
-0.085
(0.509)
-0.015
Experience
* See Panel A for a description of the variables
** P-Values are two-tailed tests.

(0.307)

0.063

(0.486)

-0.102

(0.258)

(0.876)

0.136

(0.132)

0.081

(0.369)

(0.904)

-0.028

(0.823)

-0.030

(0.816)

Panel A identifies the demographic questions asked and Panel B provides
descriptive data for the demographic covariate questions. Approximately 43
percent of the participants were males (53) and about 57 percent were females
(71). Slightly over 50 percent of the participants had previous accounting
experience (63), resulting in a mean of about 3.25 years of experience per
participant with experience.
As shown in Table 9 Panel C, only the gender variable was found to be
significantly correlated (p = .050) with any of the dependent variables. The
gender variable was correlated with credibility rating.
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4.4.2.2

Theoretical Covariates

There are several factors that are theoretically tied to credibility ratings
and the impact credibility plays in decision making. These variables are
discussed in detail in Appendix A, but will be briefly reviewed here as they relate
to the covariates in the study. The theoretical factors to consider are the
participants’ level of involvement with the task, the timing in identifying the
communicator, the advocated position of the message, and the perception of
possible knowledge and reporting biases.
4.4.2.3

Level of Involvement

Based on the theoretical model discussed in Appendix A, a participant’s
level of involvement with the task should not impact his/her ratings of
management’s credibility but should have an impact on the reliance on
management’s forecasts. Participant’s level of involvement could be an important
factor in the findings of this study so nine questions were asked to determine
participants’ level of involvement with the study (Table 10, Panel A). Participants
who were more involved in the stock market might be more involved in the task.
Panel B and Panel C of Table 10 present the descriptive statistics for the
level of involvement questions. As can be seen in Table 10, 54 percent (67) of
participants had made investments (PREVIOUSLY INVESTED) in the stock
market, while 88 percent (100) plan (PLAN TO INVEST) to invest in the stock
market (some of the participants who indicated they had invested in the stock
market also plan to invest in the stock market). When asked on a five-point scale
if they would pick their own stocks (SELF SELECT STOCKS) rather than have a
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broker select them, the group responses indicated that participants would pick
their own stocks with a mean of around 3.68, more than they would rely on a
broker to pick their stocks (BROKER), with a mean around 2.53. Participants
were also asked if they had previously performed a task similar to the one in the
study (TASK EXPERIENCE). Of the 124 participants, most had not performed a
task similar to the one in the study (mean 2.60). Most participants seemed to
enjoy the task (TASK ENJOYMENT) as they rated their mean enjoyment at
about 3.8, which was close to the “agree” end of the response scale. They also
seemed to have some confidence in their earnings per share estimates
(CONFIDENCE) as they rated the confidence question with a mean of about 3.5,
falling just between the “neutral” and “agree” points on the response scale.
Panel D of Table 10 presents the correlations between the level of
involvement questions and the dependent variables. Several of the level of
involvement questions were correlated with the credibility rating variables and
were further tested as covariates. Questions relating to participant’s investing
behavior were highly correlated with the credibility rating. The following variables
were significantly correlated with the credibility rating: PREVIOUSLY INVESTED,
SELF SELECT STOCKS, INVESTED IN MUTUAL FUND, TASK ENJOYMENT,
and CONFIDENCE. PREVIOUSLY INVESTED and CONFIDENCE were also
significantly correlated with reliance on management’s forecast in period one.
Only INVESTED IN MUTUAL FUND was significantly correlated with the
difference in credibility ratings from period one to period two. The difference in
reliance on management’s forecasts from period one to period two was
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significantly correlated with only one level of involvement question—
PREVIOUSLY INVESTED.

Table 10: Level of Involvement with Task Questions
Panel A: Variable Names, Questions and Response Format
Variable
Question
Response
PREVIOUSLY
INVESTED
Have you ever made an investment in the stock market?
Y=1/N=0
PLAN TO
INVEST
Do you plan to invest in the stock market?
Y=1/N=0
INVESTED IN
MUTUAL
FUND
Have you ever invested in a mutual fund?
Y=1/N=0
SELF
SELECT
STOCKS
I pick which stocks I want to purchase.
[SA,A,N,D,SD]
BROKER
I rely on my broker to tell me which stocks to purchase.
[SA,A,N,D,SD]
MUTUAL
FUNDS ONLY I only invest in mutual funds
[SA,A,N,D,SD]
TASK
I have previously performed tasks similar to the one in this
EXPERIENCE study.
[SA,A,N,D,SD]
TASK
ENJOYMENT
I enjoyed working on the task in this study.
[SA,A,N,D,SD]
CONFIDENCE I am confident in my earnings per share predictions.
[SA,A,N,D,SD]
Key: [SA,A,N,D,SD] = Strongly Agree (5), Agree (4), Neutral (3), Disagree (2), Strongly
Disagree (1)
Panel B: Covariate Descriptive Data for Dichotomous Variables
Variable
Previously
Invested
Plan to Invest
INVESTED IN
MUTUAL FUND

N

Mean

124
124

0.540
0.880

124

0.557

Panel C: Covariate Descriptive Data for Ordinal Variables
Variable
N
Mean*
Standard Deviation
SELF SELECT
124
3.685
1.054
STOCKS
BROKER
124
2.532
1.070
TASK
EXPERIENCE
124
2.604
1.254
TASK
ENJOYMENT
124
3.823
0.744
CONFIDENCE 124
3.508
0.791
* See Panel A for scale values for each variable.
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Minimum

Maximum

1
1

5
5

1

5

2
1

5
5

Table 10: Level of Involvement with Task Questions (Continued)
Panel D: Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Covariates and Dependent Variables (pvalues**)
Difference in
Credibility
Reliance on
Difference in
Reliance on
Variable*
Rating
Management’s
Credibility
Management’s
Forecast
Ratings
Forecast
Previously
Invested
-0.187 (0.037)
0.165 (0.068)
0.038 (0.676) 0.190 (0.035)
Plan to Invest
0.025 (0.786)
-0.009 (0.923)
0.070 (0.435) 0.112 (0.214)
INVESTED IN
MUTUAL
FUND
-0.212 (0.018)
0.116 (0.199)
-0.268 (0.003) 0.119 (0.190)
SELF SELECT
-0.173 (0.055)
-0.003 (0.974)
0.015 (0.866) 0.013 (0.888)
STOCKS
BROKER
0.056 (0.538)
-0.007 (0.937)
0.003 (0.971) 0.093 (0.306)
MUTUAL
FUNDS ONLY
0.127 (0.159)
-0.004 (0.966)
0.048 (0.595) 0.118 (0.191)
TASK
EXPERIENCE
-0.143 (0.114)
0.003 (0.978)
-0.007 (0.936) 0.039 (0.671)
TASK
ENJOYMENT
0.221 (0.014)
-0.117 (0.195)
0.032 (0.718) 0.031 (0.731)
CONFIDENCE
0.165 (0.067)
-0.154 (0.089)
0.029 (0.745) 0.075 (0.408)
* See Panel A for a description of the variables
** P-Values are two-tailed tests.

4.4.2.4

Timing in Identifying the Communicator Covariate

The model in Appendix A reveals that for people receiving a message,
timing in identifying who a communicator is can impact the role of credibility in
decision making. Timing in this sense refers to when a person is notified of the
sender of a message, which can either be before or after the message has been
given. In this study, all recipients were given communications from management
and all recipients were told the communication was from management. Two
questions were given to participants to test if they were aware that management
was responsible for the communications in this study. Consistent with the theory,
since all participants were told the identity of their communicators before
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receiving the message, the responses to this question were uncorrelated with
any of the dependent variables.
4.4.2.5

The Advocated Position of the Message

Another factor discussed in Appendix A is the position of the message.
Communicators can either give a message that is in the same direction as their
audiences’ beliefs or in an opposite direction. The participant’s initial forecast of
earnings per share was used to compare the position of the message given by
management to the participants’ beliefs about future earnings. Participants who
forecasted positive earnings per share (n= 114) over the prior period were tested
against those who forecasted negative earnings per share (n= 10) using a bivariate dummy variable. Since almost all (92 percent) of the participants
forecasted positive earnings per share over the initial prior period the results of
the comparison were insignificant.
4.4.2.6

Knowledge Bias and Reporting Bias

The message delivered by any communicator will interact with the
message recipient’s expectations of the message. Knowledge bias and reporting
bias refer to two such interactions that have been found in prior literature (Eagly
and Wood, 1978). While these two topics are covered in detail in Appendix A, a
brief review will be given here to clarify how these interactions were tested. It is
also important to note that testing for these effects occurred near the end of the
study after the treatments were given; therefore, the questions had no impact on
the main treatments, thus eliminating the possibility of confounding the results of
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the main experiment with the manipulation check questions. Unfortunately,
asking the questions at the end of the study limited the scope of the questions.
A knowledge bias would occur if the message recipient believed the
communicator’s background or education would pre-dispose the communicator
to advocating only one side or perspective of an issue. It would be confirmed if
the message delivered by the communicator was consistent with the recipient’s
pre-message expectations. A confirmed knowledge bias can reduce credibility
via the expertise factor of credibility while a disconfirmed knowledge bias can
increase perceived credibility via the expertise factor of credibility. For example,
more weight is given to a politician who gives an opinion opposite that of his
political party’s message. The message recipients are expecting the politician to
take a position in line with the politician’s party. If the politician takes the
expected position, he/she can lose credibility with the message recipients (unless
the message takes the same position held by the recipient, then credibility means
less to the decision).
A reporting bias is also an expectation from the message recipient. The
expectation is formed based on the intended audience of the communication.
That is, a recipient believes the communicator will alter the message to conform
to the beliefs of the intended audience. When a reporting bias is confirmed, the
trustworthiness factor of credibility is reduced. When a reporting bias is
disconfirmed, the trustworthiness factor of credibility is enhanced.
Three questions were used to determine if reporting or knowledge biases
were present in the study. The three questions used to test for reporting and
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knowledge biases do not allow differentiation between which bias may be
present. This study was not designed to test the impact of these biases; the
check is being used to test a possible covariate that may help remove some of
the effects of these biases, thus isolating the impact on the main treatments.
Table 11, Panel A presents the three questions used to test the
knowledge bias and reporting bias in the study. It was important to determine the
expectations of the participants with regard to what management reports. The
first question asked if participants expected management to correctly report its
earnings estimates while the other two questions both tried to determine if
participants expected management to inflate its earnings estimates and if they
expected those estimates to be positively inflated.
The descriptive data for the reporting and knowledge bias questions are
presented in Panel B of Table 11. Regarding their expectations about
management reporting earnings correctly, participants were somewhat neutral in
their response with a mean score slightly less than 3.26. They did, however,
have a higher mean (about 3.53) with respect to the belief that management
would inflate its earnings predictions. At an even higher level of agreement,
(approximately 4.22) participants indicated that management would predict
positive earnings.
Panel C of Table 11 presents the correlation data between the reporting
and knowledge bias questions and the dependent variables. The question asking
participants if they expected management to inflate its earnings estimates
(EXPECT MANAGEMENT TO INFLATE EPS) was the only variable that was
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correlated with any of the dependent variables. This variable was correlated with
both reliance on management’s forecast (H2), and the difference in reliance on
management’s forecasts (H4) from period one to period two.
Table 11: Reporting Bias and Knowledge Bias Questions
Panel A: Variable Names, Questions and Response Format
TRUST MANAGEMENT
EXPECT MANAGEMENT
TO INFLATE EPS
EXPECT POSITIVE
EARNINGS
ANNOUNCEMENTS

Managers in public companies are most likely to report
earnings estimates correctly.
I expected management to inflate their earnings
predictions.

I expected management to predict positive earnings.

[VL,L,N,U,VU]
[SA,A,N,D,SD]

[SA,A,N,D,SD]

Key:
[SA,A,N,D,SD] = Strongly Agree (5), Agree (4), Neutral (3), Disagree (2), Strongly Disagree (1)
[VL,L,N,U,VU] = Very Likely (5), Likely (4), Neutral (3), Unlikely (2), Very Unlikely (1)
Panel B: Covariate Descriptive Data
Variable
TRUST MANAGEMENT
EXPECT MANAGEMENT
TO INFLATE EPS
EXPECT POSITIVE
EARNINGS
ANNOUNCEMENTS

N

Mean*

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

124

3.258

0.927

1

5

124

3.532

1.199

1

5

124

4.218

0.704

2

5

* See Panel A for scale values for each variable.
Panel C: Covariate Correlations with Dependent Variables Using Pearson Correlation Coefficients
(p-values)
Difference in
Credibility
Reliance on
Difference in
Reliance on
Rating
Management’s
Credibility
Variable*
Management’s
Forecast
Ratings
Forecast
TRUST MANAGEMENT
EXPECT
MANAGEMENT TO
INFLATE EPS
EXPECT POSITIVE
EARNINGS
ANNOUNCEMENTS

0.130

(0.149)

-0.020

(0.822)

0.067

(0.461)

-0.033

(0.714)

0.127

(0.159)

-0.282

(0.002)

-.034

(0.706)

-0.220

(0.014)

0.109

(0.230)

-0.146

(0.105)

0.035

(0.702)

-0.002

(0.984)

* See panel A for a description of the variables.
** P-Values are two-tailed tests.
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4.4.2.7

Recent Event Covariates

The final group of variables tested as covariates related to recent events
that had occurred in the financial markets and the reaction of lawmakers to those
events (Sarbanes-Oxley). The exposure of participants to high profile financial
frauds such as Enron and WorldCom could impact participant responses.
Twelve questions were used to develop an understanding of each
participant’s exposure to and understanding of the recent events regarding
management fraud and the government reaction to those recent frauds (i.e., the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). The recent event questions are presented in Table
12, Panel A. Eight of the 12 questions deal with fraud and four questions deal
with participant’s knowledge of and beliefs about the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Table 12, Panel B and Panel C presents descriptive data regarding the
recent event questions. Participants were asked if they believed management
fraud was prevalent (FRAUD IS PREVALENT), and their responses seem to
indicate a bit of indecision with respect to the issue. Just over half of the
participants about .51 responded that they believed management fraud is
prevalent. Seemingly in agreement, when participants were asked if they would
rely on a forecast from management (TRUST MANAGEMENT FORECAST) the
mean response was a neutral 3 on a scale of 1 to 5. Participants were then
asked if they would rely on a forecast from management if an independent
auditor provided assurance on those forecasts (AUDIT ASSURANCE OF
FORECASTS). The results were a bit more positive for the effect of auditor
assurance, as the mean response to the auditor question was around 3.55.
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Of the 124 participants, 5.6 percent (7) indicated they had been defrauded
as a shareholder of a public company (PERSONAL FRAUD HISTORY), but 22.6
percent (28) of participants knew someone who had been defrauded
(ACQUAINTANCE FRAUD HISTORY) and 79.8 percent (99) had heard of
someone being defrauded by a public company (HEARD ABOUT FRAUD).
Surprisingly, 1.6 percent (2) of the participants responded that they have
committed fraud in a public company (FRAUDSTER)14.
With respect to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act recent event questions the
participants were asked if they had studied the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (STUDIED
SOX). They responded with a mean score around 4.45 indicating somewhere
between “agree” and “strongly agree” that they had studied the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. The participants also felt that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (FRAUD SOX
RELATIONSHIP) was between “relevant” and “very relevant” with respect to
fraud (mean about 4.37). The last two questions asked participants if they were
familiar with the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB
FAMILIARITY) and if they were familiar with Auditing Standard No. 2 as issued
by the PCAOB (ASNO2 FAMILIARITY). The results for these two questions were
somewhat consistent as participants were close to “agree” that they knew about
the PCAOB (mean about 3.82), and they were between “neutral” and “agree” on
the question regarding their familiarity with the Auditing Standard No. 2
promulgation, with a mean rating of 3.54.

14

Both of these participant’s responses to other questions were checked to determine if they
were not taking the study seriously. Based on the time they spent on questions before and after
this question it did appear the participants at least took a reasonable amount of time to answer
these questions.
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Panel D of Table 12 presents the correlations between the recent events
covariates and the dependent variables. The recent event covariates could be
split into two sections, recent events regarding management fraud and the
events that transpired in reaction to those events (e.g., the passage of the
Sarbanes Oxley Act). Only one of the questions associated with management
and fraud was significantly correlated with any of the dependent variables, while
all four of the Sarbanes-Oxley questions were correlated with at least one of the
dependent variables. The fraud question that asked if the participant had been
defrauded as a shareholder of a public company was significantly correlated with
the credibility rating. For the Sarbanes-Oxley questions, the question asking
participants if they had studied the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in their accounting
courses was correlated with the difference in management’s credibility ratings
from period one to period two. The question asking the importance of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was significantly correlated with the credibility rating and the
reliance on management’s forecast. The questions asking students about their
familiarity with Auditing Standard No. 2 and the PCAOB were also significantly
correlated with the credibility rating variable.
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Table 12: Recent Event Questions
Panel A: Variable Names, Questions and Response Format
Variable
FRAUD IS
PREVALENT
PERSONAL
FRAUD
HISTORY
ACQUAINTANCE
FRAUD
HISTORY
HEARD ABOUT
FRAUD
FRAUDSTER
TRUST
MANAGEMENT
FORECASTS
AUDIT
ASSURANCE OF
FORECAST
STUDIED SOX
FRAUD SOX
RELATIONSHIP

Question

Response

Do you believe management fraud is prevalent?

Y=1/N=0

Have you ever been defrauded as a shareholder of a
public company?

Y=1/N=0

Do you know of someone who has been defrauded
by a public company?
Have you ever heard of someone who was
defrauded by a public company?
Have you ever committed fraud as a member of
management?
I trust management in providing me with foreword
looking forecasts.
I would rely on management’s forward looking
forecasts if an independent auditor provided
assurance on management’s assertions.
I have studied Sarbanes-Oxley in my accounting
courses.
With regard to fraud, I believe Sarbanes-Oxley is:
I am familiar with the requirements of PCAOB
Auditing Standard No. 2, "An Audit of Internal Control
over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction
with an Audit of Financial Statements."

Y=1/N=0
Y=1/N=0
Y=1/N=0

[SA,A,N,D,SD]

[SA,A,N,D,SD]
[SA,A,N,D,SD]
[VR,R,N,I,VI]

ASNO2
[SA,A,N,D,SD]
FAMILIARITY
PCAOB
FAMILIARITY
I know what the PCAOB is.
[SA,A,N,D,SD]
Key:
[SA,A,N,D,SD] = Strongly Agree (5), Agree (4),Neutral (3), Disagree (2), Strongly
Disagree (1)
[VR,R,N,I,VI] =Very Relevant (5), Relevant (4),Neutral (3), Irrelevant (2), Very Irrelevant (1)
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Table 12: Recent Event Questions (Continued)
Panel B: Recent Event Covariates Descriptive Data for Dichotomous Covariate
Variables
Variable
N
Mean
Standard Deviation
FRAUD IS
124
0.508
0.502
PREVALENT
PERSONAL
FRAUD HISTORY 124
0.056
0.232
ACQUAINTANCE
FRAUD HISTORY 124
0.226
0.420
HEARD ABOUT
FRAUD
124
0.798
0.403
FRAUDSTER
124
0.016
0.126
Panel C: Recent Event Covariates Descriptive Data for Ordinal Covariate Variables
Variable
N
Mean
Standard Deviation
Min
Max
TRUST
MANAGEMENT
FORECASTS
124
3.000
0.855
1
4
AUDIT
ASSURANCE OF
FORECAST
124
3.548
0.868
2
5
STUDIED SOX
124
4.452
0.780
1
5
FRAUD SOX
RELATIONSHIP
124
4.371
0.643
2
5
ASNO2
FAMILIARITY
124
3.540
1.340
1
5
PCAOB
FAMILIARITY
124
3.823
1.437
1
5
* See Panel A for scale values for each variable.

84

Table 12: Recent Event Questions (Continued)
Panel D: Covariate Correlations with Dependent Variables Using Pearson Correlation
Coefficients (p-values**)
Difference in
Credibility
Reliance on
Difference in
Reliance on
Variable*
Rating
Management’s
Credibility
Management’s
Forecast
Ratings
Forecast
FRAUD IS
PREVALENT
0.048
(0.598)
0.014
(0.879)
0.099
(0.274)
0.018
(0.846)
PERSONAL
FRAUD
HISTORY
(0.038)
-0.187
0.051
(0.575)
-0.054
(0.549)
0.055
(0.546)
ACQUAINTANCE
FRAUD
HISTORY
0.016
(0.860)
0.069
(0.449)
0.040
(0.657)
0.112
(0.215)
HEARD ABOUT
FRAUD
-0.072
(0.424) -0.010
(0.910)
0.045
(0.616)
0.043
(0.636)
FRAUDSTER
0.026
(0.774) -0.122
(0.179)
0.093
(0.300)
-0.117
(0.198)
TRUST
MANAGEMENT
FORECASTS
0.007
(0.939)
0.115
(0.204)
-0.144
(0.109)
0.106
(0.243)
AUDIT
ASSURANCE OF
FORECAST
0.138
(0.128) -0.041
(0.651)
-0.052
(0.566)
-0.004
(0.968)
STUDIED SOX
(0.038)
0.129
(0.152) -0.044
(0.627)
-0.186
-0.051
(0.575)
FRAUD SOX
RELATIONSHIP
(0.004) -0.159
(0.078)
0.260
0.024
(0.791)
-0.048
(0.597)
ASNO2
FAMILIARITY
(0.001)
0.283
0.075
(0.406)
0.042
(0.643)
0.101
(0.267)
PCAOB
FAMILIARITY
(0.026)
0.200
0.033
(0.715)
-0.003
(0.970)
0.101
(0.264)
* All participants had read about a fraud being committed.
** P-Values are two-tailed tests.

4.4.2.8

Summary of Covariate Findings

The results of the covariate testing found several variables correlated with
the dependent variables in this study. This section contains a brief discussion of
the covariates included in the model used to test the hypotheses. The discussion
relates each covariate to the dependent variables with which they were
correlated.
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4.4.2.8.1

Covariates Correlated with Credibility Rating (H1)

The covariates that were correlated with the credibility rating (H1) were
determined by testing each potential covariate’s correlation with the credibility
rating from period one of the study. Table 13 summarizes the correlated
covariates with credibility rating by type of covariate.
Table 13: Covariates Correlated with Credibility Rating (H1)
Variable*
Correlation P-Value**
Gender
-0.177
0.050
PREVIOUSLY
INVESTED
-0.187
0.037
SELF SELECT
STOCKS
-0.173
0.055
INVESTED IN
MUTUAL FUND
-0.212
0.018
TASK
ENJOYMENT
0.221
0.014
CONFIDENCE
0.165
0.067
PERSONAL
FRAUD
HISTORY
-0.187
0.038
FRAUD SOX
RELATIONSHIP
0.260
0.004
PCAOB
FAMILIARITY
0.200
0.026
ASNO2
FAMILIARITY
0.283
0.001
** P-Values are two-tailed tests.

Type of Covariate
Demographic

Reference Table
Table 9

Level of Involvement

Table 10

Level of Involvement

Table 10

Level of Involvement

Table 10

Level of Involvement
Level of Involvement

Table 10
Table 10

Recent Events

Table 12

Recent Events

Table 12

Recent Events

Table 12

Recent Events

Table 12

Once the significantly correlated variables were identified they were
further tested for inclusion in the final model by running a preliminary ANCOVA
analysis. This analysis included the independent variable tone of management
letter (Internal Control Letter) used to test H1 as well as all of the identified
covariates. Using an alpha of .10, only four of the correlated variables were
significant in the model as presented in Table 14. Participants’ prior history with
investing in mutual funds (INVESTED IN MUTUAL FUND) (F=3.53, two-tailed p=
.063), their confidence in their earnings per share estimates (CONFIDENCE) (F =
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5.82, two-tailed p= .018), their familiarity with Sarbanes-Oxley (FRAUD SOX
RELATIONSHIP) (F = 9.47, two-tailed p= .002), and their familiarity with Auditing
Standard No. 2 (ASNO2 FAMILIARITY), (F=2.97, two-tailed p= .087) were
included in the final model used to test H1.
Table 14: Preliminary ANCOVA Testing of Credibility Rating (H1) Using Covariates
Variable*
Internal Control
Letter
PERSONAL
FRAUD
HISTORY
FRAUD SOX
RELATIONSHIP
PCAOB
FAMILIARITY
ASNO2
FAMILIARITY
Gender
PREVIOUSLY
INVESTED
INVESTED IN
MUTUAL FUND
SELF SELECT
STOCKS
TASK
ENJOYMENT
CONFIDENCE

DF

Sum of Squares

Mean Squares

F Statistic

P-Value**

1

10.755

10.755

7.15

0.009

1

1.845

1.845

1.23

0.270

1

14.246

14.246

9.47

0.002

1

2.177

2.177

1.45

0.231

1
1

4.472
1.327

4.472
1.327

2.97
0.88

0.087
0.350

1

2.981

2.981

1.98

0.162

1

5.305

5.305

3.53

0.063

1

3.587

3.587

2.38

0.125

1
1

1.707
8.753

1.707
8.753

1.13
5.82

0.289
0.018

Model
Error
Corrected Total

11
112
123

84.858
168.430
253.289

7.714
1.503

5.13

0.0001

n = 124
*See tables 9-12 for variable descriptions
** P-Values are two-tailed tests.

4.4.2.8.2

Covariates Correlated with Reliance on Management’s Forecasts

The four variables correlated with the participants’ reliance on
management’s forecasts are presented in Table 15. The covariates were further
tested against the reliance on management’s forecasts by running a preliminary
ANCOVA analysis. As Table 16 demonstrates, all four of the potential covariates
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were significant using an alpha of .10. Consequently, all four covariates are used
in the hypothesis testing.
Table 15: Covariates Correlated with Reliance on Management’s Forecast (H2)
Reference
Variable*
Correlation P-Value**
Type of Covariate
Table
PREVIOUSLY
INVESTED
0.165
0.068 Level of Involvement
Table 10
CONFIDENCE
-0.154
0.089 Level of Involvement
Table 10
EXPECT
MANAGEMENT
Reporting and Knowledge
INFLATE EPS
-0.282
0.002 Bias
Table 11
FRAUD SOX
RELATIONSHIP
-0.159
0.078 Recent Events
Table 12
** P-Values are two-tailed tests.

Table 16: Preliminary ANCOVA Testing of Reliance on Management’s Forecast (H2)
Using Covariates
Variable
Internal Control
Letter
FRAUD SOX
RELATIONSHIP
CONFIDENCE
PREVIOUSLY
INVESTED
EXPECT
MANAGEMENT
INFLATE EPS

DF

Sum of Squares

Mean Squares

F Statistic

P-Value**

1

0.031

0.031

4.27

0.041

1
1

0.046
0.050

0.046
0.050

6.31
6.88

0.013
0.010

1

0.025

0.025

3.39

0.067

1

0.071

0.071

9.71

0.002

0.042
0.007

5.86

<0.000

Model
5
0.214
Error
118
0.862
Corrected Total
123
1.077
*See tables 9-12 for variable descriptions.
** P-Values are two-tailed tests.

4.4.2.8.3

Covariate for the Difference in Credibility Ratings

H3 measures the difference in credibility ratings from period one to period
two by examining the difference in participants’ ratings of management’s
credibility on the McCroskey and Teven (1999) credibility scale. Table 17 shows
that only two of the potential covariates were correlated with the difference in
credibility ratings.
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Table 17: Covariates Correlated with the Difference in Credibility Ratings (H3)
Variable*
Correlation P-Value**
INVESTED IN
MUTUAL
0.271
0.002
FUND
STUDIED
SOX
-0.186
0.039
** P-Values are two-tailed tests.

Type of Covariate

Reference Table

Level of Involvement

Table 10

Recent Events

Table 12

A preliminary ANCOVA was run using both the independent variable and
both of the significantly correlated covariates. The results presented in Table 18
show that both the participants’ mutual fund investing experience (F = 9.06, twotailed p= .032) and their studying of Sarbanes-Oxley (F = 4.17, two-tailed p=
.043) were significant (alpha = .10) variables in the model. Thus, both covariates
are included in the tests of H3.
Table 18: Preliminary ANCOVA Testing of Difference in Credibility Ratings (H3) Using
Covariates
Mean
Squares
Variable*
DF
Sum of Squares
F Statistic
P-Value**
FINANCIAL
RESULTS LETTER
1
3.866
3.866
2.66
0.105
INVESTED IN
1
13.149
13.149
9.06
0.032
MUTUAL FUND
STUDIED SOX
1
6.059
6.059
4.17
0.043
Model
3
24.147
8.049
Error
120
174.160
1.451
Corrected Total
123
205.486
*See tables 9-12 for descriptive statistics of the variables
** P-Values are two-tailed tests.

5.55

0.0013

4.4.2.8.4
Covariates for the Difference in Reliance on Management’s
Forecasts (H4)
In this study, the difference in reliance on management forecasts (H4) is
measured as the difference between the reliance on management’s earnings per
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share estimates made in period one and the reliance on management’s earnings
per share estimates in period two. To control for the residual experimental effects
of period one in this study, a variable was created to measure the usefulness of
management’s prediction in period one15. The useful variable was measured as
the difference between the participants’ final earnings per share prediction in
period one and the actual results of earnings per share in period one. High
(positive) values of the useful variable indicate that participants’ final estimates of
earnings per share were above the actual earnings per share for the period. Low
(negative) values of the useful variable indicate that the participants’ final
estimates of earnings per share were below the actual earnings per share for
period one. For example if a participant selected $2.00 as his/her initial earnings
per share estimate, management would predict earnings per share for the period
of $2.64. The surprise in management’s prediction is $.64. On average
participants in the high intention tone treatment revised their earnings per share
estimates about 33 percent of the surprise in management’s forecast. So this
participant would have adjusted their earnings per share estimate to $2.21 ($2.00
initial prediction plus 33 percent of the $.64 surprise). Actual earnings per share
for this participant’s example would be 1.09 percent of the initial earnings per
share or $2.18 ($2.00 * 1.09). The useful measure for this example would be
$.03 as the participant’s estimate was $.03 higher than the actual earnings per
share. In period two this participant was less likely to rely on management’s
forecast than someone with a negative useful score. This was seen in
correlation testing where the useful variable was highly correlated in a negative
15

See the discussion in the post hoc analysis section as well as in the studies limitations.
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direction with the difference in reliance on management forecasts variable. The
higher the useful variable the less reliance on management’s forecast in period
two.
Table 19 below presents the actual useful calculations based on the
period one treatment conditions. As can be seen from the table, participants in
the high intention condition had a mean revised earnings per share estimate of
about $2.21, while participants in the no intention treatment condition had a
mean revised estimate of earnings per share of around $2.11. The mean actual
earnings per share for the high intention group was just over $2.17, while the
actual earnings per share for the no intention group was about $2.15. After
rounding, the usefulness of management’s forecast was $.04 for participants in
the high intention treatment while it was $- .04 for participants in the no intention
treatment condition.
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Table 19: Calculation of the Useful Covariate by Period One Treatment Condition

Treatment
Condition
(Period One)

Participants’ Period
One Revised
EPS Estimate
Mean (Std. dev.)
Min - Max

Period One Actual
Earnings Per Share
Mean (Std. dev.)
Min - Max

Usefulness of Period
One EPS Estimate **
Mean (Std. dev.)
Min - Max

High
Intention

$ 2.206 (.264)
$1.550 – $2.870

$ 2.173 (.125)
$1.635 – $2.452

$.037 (2.11)
$-.616 – $.185

$ 2.113 (.279)
$ 2.148 (.230)
$-.038 (.153)
$.500 – $2.600
$.545 – $2.398
$-.429 – $.189
* Calculated as Participant’s Initial Earnings Per Share * 1. 09
** Calculated as Actual Period One EPS – Participant’s Revised Period One EPS Estimate
No Intention

Table 20 presents the descriptive statistics for the useful variable based
on the period two treatment conditions. Participants’ who received the high
intention tone financial statement letter had a positive difference (mean =.026)
between their earnings per share estimates in period one and actual earnings per
share. The positive difference is indicative of estimating earnings per share
above the actual earnings per share for the period. The participants who received
the no intention tone financial statement letter had a negative difference (mean =
-.024) between their earnings per share estimates in period one and the actual
period one results. The negative difference indicates that the participants had
underestimated actual earnings per share. This relationship between the
usefulness of period one’s forecast and the amount of difference in reliance on
management’s forecasts in period two is further examined in the post hoc
analysis.
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Table 20: Descriptive Statistics for the Useful Covariate by Year Two Treatment
High Intention Letter
No Intention Letter
Mean
Mean
Covariate
(Standard Dev)
Min
Max
(Standard Dev)
Min
Useful*
0.026 (0.177)
-0.616
0.189
-0.024 (0.195)
-.494

Max
0.190

* The useful variable measured the difference between participants’ second earnings per share
estimate in period one and the actual period one earnings per share for the company

As can be seen in Table 21, the new variable, useful, was found to be a
significantly correlated with the difference in reliance on management’s forecasts
(H4). In addition to the useful covariate, two other potential covariates were found
to be significantly correlated with the dependent variable at an alpha of .05. The
variable that measured participants’ belief that management would inflate its
earnings, along with the question asking if participants planned to invest in the
stock market.
Table 21: Covariates Correlated with the Difference in Reliance on Management
Forecasts (H4)
Reference
Variable*
Correlation P-Value**
Type of Covariate
Table
Control Variable for Period
Table 19
Useful
-0.788
0.000 One
EXPECT
MANAGEMENT
Table 11
Reporting and Knowledge
INFLATE EPS
-0.220
0.014 Bias
PREVIOUSLY
Table 10
INVESTED
0.190
0.035 Level of Involvement
** P-Values are two-tailed tests.

The results of a preliminary ANCOVA test are presented in Table 22. An
ANCOVA was used to examine the covariates in relationship to the dependent
variable while controlling for the relationship to the independent variable. Only
the useful variable was significant (F = 177.65, two-tailed p< .000), using an
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alpha of .10. The two other potential covariates were insignificant and will not be
included in the final testing of the hypothesis.
Table 22: Preliminary ANCOVA Testing Difference in Reliance on Management
Forecasts (H4) Using Covariates
Sum of
Mean
Variable*
DF Squares
Squares
F Statistic
P-Value**
Financial Results Letter
Previously Invested
Expect Management
Inflate EPS
Useful

1
1

0.036
0.033

0.040
0.032

1.3
1.08

0.257
0.301

1
1

0.004
5.416

0.003
5.412

0.12
177.65

0.733
0.000

Model
4
6.133
Error
119
3.628
Corrected Total
123
9.761
* See tables 9-12 for variable descriptions
** P-Values are two-tailed tests.

1.533
0.030

50.29

0.000

4.4.3 MANCOVA Testing
The dependent variables in this study are examined to determine if they
are correlated. When using multiple dependent variables that are correlated the
MANCOVA model is used to determine the main and interaction effects of the
independent variables to the combined dependent variables. Table 23 presents
the results of the correlation analysis on the dependent variables. There are two
dependent variables for both periods of the study. In period one the dependent
variables are management’s credibility rating and the participants’ reliance on
management’s forecast. As can be seen in Panel A of Table 23, these two
dependent variables are correlated (Pearson -.195, p = .029) indicating that using
a MANCOVA model is appropriate.
In period two there are also two dependent variables. The first dependent
variable is the change in credibility ratings and the second dependent variable is
the change in reliance on management’s forecasts. As can be seen in Panel B of
94

Table 23, these two dependent variables are not correlated, and therefore are
not examined using a MANCOVA model.
Table 23: Correlation Between Dependent Variables by Period
Panel A: Correlation Between Period One Dependent Variables
Variable
Credibility Rating (H1) & Reliance on Management’s
Forecast (H2)

Correlation

P-Value
-.195

Panel B: Correlation Between Period Two Dependent Variables
Variable
Correlation
Difference in Credibility Ratings (H3) & Difference in
Reliance on Management’s Forecast (H4)
-.014

.029

P-Value
.873

Table 24 Panel A presents the results of the MANCOVA model examining
the significance of the internal control letter on both dependent variables from
period one. As the table shows, the F statistic is significant for the internal control
letter (Wilks’ Lambda .899, F = 6.46, P= .002). Since the intention factor is
significant in the MANCOVA it is appropriate to conduct a separate ANCOVA
analysis for each dependent variable. Panels B and C of Table 24 present the
separate ANCOVA models for each of the dependent variables.
In Panel B of Table 24 the impact of the internal control letter on credibility
rating is significant (F = .7.19, two-tailed p = .008). Those covariates that are
significant (p=.10) will be retained for the analysis of H1.
As can bee seen in Panel C of Table 24, the impact of the internal control
letter on the reliance on management’s forecast is also significant (F = 3.19, twotailed p = .077). Again, those covariates that are significant (P=.10) will be
retained for the analysis of H2.
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Table 24: Results for Internal Control Letter’s Impact on Credibility Ratings and
Reliance on Management’s Forecast
Panel A: MANCOVA Results for Internal Control Letter on Credibility Ratings &
Reliance on Management’s Forecast
Wilks’ Lambda .899, F Statistic = 6.46, P = .002
Panel B: ANCOVA Results for Internal Control Letter on Credibility Rating
Sum of
Mean
Squares
Squares F Statistic
Variable
DF
Internal Control Letter
1
11.033
11.033
7.19
FRAUD SOX RELATIONSHIP
1
17.145
17.145
11.17
CONFIDENCE
1
8.126
8.126
5.29
ASNO2 FAMILIARITY
1
5.916
5.916
3.85
INVESTED IN MUTUAL FUND
1
4.662
4.662
3.04
Previously Invested
1
9.037
9.037
5.89
Expect Management Inflate
EPS
1
4.184
4.184
2.73
Model
Error
Corrected Total

7
116
123

75.191
178.097
253.289

10.741
1.535

7.0

P-Value*
.008
.001
.023
.052
.084
.016
.102
<.000

Panel C: ANCOVA Results for Internal Control Letter on Reliance on Management’s
Forecast
Sum of
Mean
Variable
DF Squares Squares F Statistic
P-Value*
Internal Control Letter
1
.227
.227
3.19
.077
FRAUD SOX RELATIONSHIP
1
.538
.538
7.56
.007
CONFIDENCE
1
.503
.503
7.06
.009
ASNO2 FAMILIARITY
1
.097
.097
1.35
.247
INVESTED IN MUTUAL FUND
1
.071
.071
.99
.321
Previously Invested
1
.125
.125
1.76
.188
Expect Management Inflate EPS
1
.722
.722
10.14
.002
Model
Error
Corrected Total

7
116
123

2.255
8.262
10.518

.322
.071

4.52

<.000

Internal Control Letter: Treatment given with either high intention tone or no intention tone.
FRAUD SOX RELATIONSHIP: Question asked the relevance of Sarbanes-Oxley to fraud.
CONFIDENCE: Asked participants their confidence in their earnings per share predictions.
ASNO2 FAMILIARITY: Asked participants about their familiarity with Auditing Standard No. 2.
INVESTED IN MUTUAL FUND: Asked participants if they had invested in mutual funds.
Previously Invested: Asked participants if they had previously invested in the stock market.
Expect Management Inflate EPS: Asked if they expected management to inflate earnings.
*P-Values are all two-tailed tests
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4.4.4

Statistical Assumptions Testing
Since the overall MANCOVA model was significant, the analysis

proceeded with ANCOVA models for testing the hypothesis for each dependent
variable. As a first step, the statistical assumptions associated with ANCOVA
were evaluated. Therefore, in this section the statistical assumptions regarding
each of the dependent variables are tested and discussed. Although different
statistical methods may be used to analyze each of the hypotheses, most of the
multivariate procedures have similar assumptions regarding the dependent
variables. After examining whether there are violations of any of the assumptions
underlying the statistical procedure for each hypothesis, the hypotheses will be
discussed and tested.
ANCOVA tests are most appropriate when looking for main and interaction
effects of a categorical independent variable and covariates on a dependent
variable. There are three assumptions that should be met for the ANCOVA
procedure: 1) each observation should be independent, 2) the dependent
variables should follow a normal distribution, and 3) the variances between the
groups should be equal (Hair et al. 1998). The accuracy of the ANCOVA
procedure is also sensitive to data that is not representative of the sample
population (outliers) (Hair et al. 1998).
This section proceeds as follows. Each of the assumptions are discussed
and tested for each of the dependent variables in the model. A discussion of the
assumption of independent observations is next followed by a discussion of the
tests of normality, heteroscedasticity, and outliers.
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4.4.4.1 Independent Observations
With respect to the assumption of independent observations, all
participants in this study were randomly assigned to one of the treatments. No
participants were allowed to participate in this study more than once and all
participants worked individually. Therefore, each observation is independent of
all others.
4.4.4.2 Multivariate Normality
Several methods were used to test if the dependent variables followed a
normal distribution. Box and whisker plots and normal probability plots were used
to graphically analyze the data. Normal probability plots allow a visual inspection
of the data against a theoretically normal distribution pattern. Statistical methods
measuring the skewness and kurtosis of the data were also examined for each
dependent variable. Reported kurtosis numbers indicate the peak of the
distribution, while skewness numbers indicate if the observations fall
disproportionately to the left or the right of the distribution. Two statistical tests
were also used to determine if a variable is normally distributed. The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and the Anderson-Darling statistics both test if data come
from a normal distribution.
With respect to the credibility rating (H1), normal probability plots indicated
the data were slightly skewed to the right, which was consistent with the
skewness statistic of .43. The kurtosis statistic was -.369, which was represented
in a graph as a higher peak around the midpoint of the data. The graphical
results were consistent with the Anderson-Darling (p=.012) statistic but not the
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov (p= .133) statistics. While the plots seemed to indicate the
data were not normally distributed, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test failed to find
non-normality in the data set.
In testing for normality in the reliance on management forecast variable
(H2), normal probability plots, a histogram and box and whisker plots indicated
the reliance on management forecast data were positively skewed (skewness
.96), with an overall low peak or very mild kurtosis (.13). Consistent with the
graphical observations, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (p=.010) and Anderson-Darling
(p=.005) tests indicated the data were not normally distributed.
An examination of the difference in credibility ratings (H3) variable for
normality indicated that the distribution of responses for this variable was not
normally distributed. This is indicated graphically by normal probability plots, and
a histogram that shows the data follow a normal distribution with a peak showing
larger observations above the mean (kurtosis .43) and negative skewness (-.59).
Statistical testing also indicated the data did not follow a normal distribution with
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (p = .010) and the Anderson-Darling (p=.005) tests
rejecting the hypothesis that the data were normally distributed.
The plots related to the distribution of participant’s difference in reliance on
management’s forecasts (H4) indicated the data were positively skewed (.35)
with slightly more observations in the upper end of the tail (kurtosis .21). The
conclusions reached by the graphical analysis were supported by a statistical
analysis of the data using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (p = .010) and AndersonDarling (p = .005), which rejected the hypothesis of normally distributed data.
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While only one of the four dependent variables met the assumption of
normality, the ANCOVA method is robust to even critical violations of the
normality assumption (Keppel 1982). The robustness of the ANCOVA
methodology with respect to violations of normality is even greater when an
equal number of observations per treatment group is compared, which is the
case in this study. For these reasons, no adjustments were made to the data to
address the non-normality found in the data.
4.4.4.3. Variance Between Groups
Testing the variances between groups involves looking at all of the levels
of the independent variables to determine if the variance is similar at all levels.
When the variance in the dependent variable is similar for all levels of the
independent variable, the data are said to be homoscedastic. When there is a
different amount of variance in the dependent variable at each level of the
independent variable, the data are said to be heteroscedastic. Two tests were
conducted to check for heteroscedasticity. A Levene’s test for equality of
variances was used, and a linear relationship was examined between the
squared residuals and the predicted values for the dependent variables. The
second test was conducted since it has already been determined the data are
non-normal and a Levene’s test is sensitive to non-normality.
Using a Levene’s test of equal variances, it was determined that the
credibility rating (H1) data did not display equal variance at all levels of the
independent variable (p =.089). However, less than 1 percent of the variation in
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the squared residuals was found to be associated with the predicted period one
credibility rating variable, indicating no significant variance problems.
The Levene’s test was also run for the reliance on management’s forecast
(H2) variable. Test results indicated that the distribution of responses displayed
unequal variances across treatment conditions (p = .024). This was also found by
testing the linear relationship between the squared residuals and the predicted
values of the dependent variables. The results indicated that 13.7 percent of the
variation in the squared residuals was associated with the variation in the
predicted values.
In testing the variance between groups for the difference in credibility ratings
(H3) variable, the Levene’s test indicated the variance in the data was not
consistent at all levels of the independent variable (p = .014). Evidence
contradicting the Levene’s test indicated less than 1 percent of the variance in
the squared residuals was associated with the predicted difference in credibility
ratings variable.
Finally, when testing the variance between groups for difference in reliance
on management’s forecast (H4), the Levene’s test indicated the variance
displayed was equal for all four treatment groups (p =.169).
Only one of the four variables consistently displayed heteroscedasticity
(reliance on management’s forecast). While it is prudent to exercise caution
when interpreting results involving heteroscedasticity, the heteroscedasticity
involving reliance on management’s forecasts has been mitigated by the use of
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equal cell sizes (Glass and Hopkins 1996; Garson 2006). Therefore, the
heteroscedasticity found in the variables in this study is not a concern.
4.4.4.4. Testing for Outliers
Outliers are data points that seem to indicate they may not be
representative of the sample population. An assumption of the ANCOVA
procedure is that the data are representative of the sample population. To test
the data regarding representativeness in relation to the sample population,
statistical tests were conducted to find potential outliers in the dataset.
A Studentized Residual statistic was used to determine if there were
outliers. The Studentized Residual procedure looks at the influence of each data
point by removing it from the analysis and then examining the influence the
individual observation had on the overall significance of the model. The
calculation for the Studentized Residual statistic divides the deleted residual
value by its standard error. A cutoff residual value of +/- 3.641 is used as a rule of
thumb to identify outliers (Mendenhall and Sincich 1996). No outliers were found
with respect credibility ratings (H1), the reliance on management’s forecast (H2),
and for the difference in credibility rating (H3). Two outliers were identified for
the difference in reliance on management’s forecasts (H4). The model was tested
with both values eliminated. There was little effect on the overall model’s
significance after removing these observations but the observations did have a
significant effect on the results of the ANCOVA for the main treatment (the
financial results letter). The significance level of the t-test for the financial results
letter went from .125 to .235. Since the results for H4 are insignificant, both with
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and without these two observations the observations were kept in the model
leaving the model with an equal number of observations per cell.
4.4.4.5 Assumptions Testing Summary
While some of the assumptions tested were found to be violated, the
statistical method (ANCOVA) employed in this study is fairly robust with respect
to violations of normality and heteroscedasticity when there are equal treatment
groups as was the case in this study (Glass and Hopkins 1996; Garson 2006).
The one instance where outliers were observed (H4) did not impact the
interpretation of the results.
4.5 Hypothesis Testing
In this section the statistical results for the four hypotheses are presented.
Descriptive statistics for the relevant variables are presented first. Conclusions
about the degree of support for the hypotheses are presented in this chapter.
The overall conclusions regarding the results of the hypotheses tests are
discussed in Chapter 5.
4.5.1 Testing of H1 and H2
The effect of the report on internal control (either high intention tone or no
intention tone) was tested on the dependent variables, credibility rating (H1) and
the reliance on management’s forecast (H2). The significant covariates identified
in section 4.4 were included in each model to account for their potential impact
on the dependent variables.
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4.5.1.1

Management’s Credibility Rating (H1)

H1 predicted that users given management’s letter on internal controls
with a high intention tone would rate management’s credibility higher than
participants given management’s letter on internal controls with a no intention
tone. To determine the credibility rating (H1), participants completed the
McCroskey and Teven (1999) credibility scale. The scale consists of 18 items
with six questions for each of three factors: intention, trustworthiness, and
expertise. To simplify the data analysis, the average credibility score was used
for testing differences between the groups.
Table 25 presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent variable,
credibility rating. As can be seen in Table 25, participants who were given
management’s report on internal controls with the high intention tone rated
management’s credibility higher (mean = 7.886) than participants who received
the report with the no intention manipulation (mean = 7.088). These means are
in line with H1, which predicted that participants in the high intention treatment
would rate management’s credibility higher than would participants in the no
intention treatment.
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Table 25: Descriptive Statistics for Credibility Rating (H1)
Descriptive Statistics for the Credibility Rating by Management Internal Control Letter
Treatment
High Intention Letter
No Intention Letter
Mean
Mean
Covariate
(Standard Dev)
Min
Max
(Standard Dev)
Min
Max
Credibility
Rating
7.886 (1.517)
5.055
11.000
7.008 (1.235)
4.222
11.000
Credibility Rating: The average of the 18 questions from the McCroskey and Teven (1999)
Credibility Scale

To see if the participants in the high intention internal control letter
treatment rated management’s credibility higher than participants who were given
the no intention internal control letter (H1) an ANCOVA was run using the internal
control report as the treatment and credibility rating as the dependent variable.
Four covariates identified in Table 14 as possibly impacting credibility rating were
also included in the model: participant’s confidence in completing the task
(CONFIDENCE), their views on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (FRAUD SOX
RELATIONSHIP), their prior mutual fund investments (INVESTED IN MUTUAL
FUND), and their familiarity with Auditing Standard No. 2 (ASNO2
FAMILIARITY). Table 26 shows the results of the ANCOVA model. The overall
model is statistically significant (F = 7.94, two-tailed p< .001).
Table 26 also indicates that the impact of the different internal control
letters on credibility ratings was significant (F = 6.94, one tail p=.006). The
significant effect was in the direction hypothesized (see Table 22), supporting H1.
All four of the covariates were significant factors in the model. Three of the
covariates were positively correlated with management’s credibility ratings and
one was negatively correlated with management’s credibility rating. Participants’
105

opinions regarding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (FRAUD SOX RELATIONSHIP) were
significantly (F = 9.20, two-tailed p = .003) associated with credibility ratings,
indicating that more knowledge of Sarbanes-Oxley led to higher ratings of
management’s credibility. Participants’ confidence (CONFIDENCE) in
completing the task was also significantly (F =4.66, two-tailed p = .033)
associated with the ratings of management’s credibility, indicating that more
confidence led to higher ratings of management’s credibility. Understanding of
Auditing Standard No. 2 (ASNO2 FAMILIARITY) was also significantly (F =4.31,
two-tailed, p = .040) associated with management credibility ratings, as greater
understanding of Auditing Standard No. 2 led to higher credibility ratings.
Investment history with mutual funds was significantly (F =8.91, two-tailed p =
.004) associated with management’s credibility ratings as well, but higher values
on this question led to lower management credibility ratings.
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Table 26: ANCOVA Results for Internal Control Letter’s Impact on Credibility Ratings
(H1)
Sum of
Mean
Variable
DF Squares
Squares F Statistic
P-Value
Internal Control Letter
1
10.422
10.422
6.49
.006*
FRAUD SOX RELATIONSHIP
1
14.770
14.770
9.20
.003
CONFIDENCE
1
7.485
7.485
4.66
.033
ASNO2 FAMILIARITY
1
6.914
6.914
4.31
.040
INVESTED IN MUTUAL FUND
1
14.302
14.302
8.91
.004
Model
Error
Corrected Total

5
118
123

63.790
189.499
253.289

12.758
1.606

7.94

<.000

Internal Control Letter: Treatment given with either high intention tone or no intention tone.
FRAUD SOX RELATIONSHIP: Question asked the relevance of Sarbanes-Oxley to fraud.
CONFIDENCE: Question asked participants their confidence in their earnings per share
predictions.
ASNO2 FAMILIARITY: Question asked participants about their familiarity with Auditing
Standard No. 2.
INVESTED IN MUTUAL FUND: Question asked participants if they had invested in mutual
funds
*P-Value adjusted for one-tailed test for Internal Control Letter only.

4.5.1.2

Reliance on Management’s Forecast (H2)

H2 predicts that users given management’s letter on internal controls with
a high intention tone will rely more on management’s forecasts by revising their
EPS forecast closer to management’s forecast than participants given the
internal control letter with no intention tone. Before testing H2, the participants’
initial earnings per share estimates were compared between groups. The tone of
the internal control letter should not have an effect on the initial earnings per
share estimates made by participants. It was important to test the differences
between the groups’ initial earnings per share estimates because the tone of the
internal control letters is expected to impact the participants’ perception of
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management’s credibility, and therefore, the amount by which participants rely on
management’s forecast. The hypothesized relationship is between the two
versions of the internal control letter and participants’ reliance on management’s
forecast and not the participants’ initial predictions. The results of the study could
be impacted if the different internal control letters systematically resulted in user’s
estimating different initial earnings per share estimates for the company. As seen
in Table 27 both groups had similar predictions for period one. The mean for the
high intention treatment was $1.99 and the mean for the no intention treatment
was $1.97, resulting in a statistically insignificant (t = .55, two-tailed p = .461)
mean difference of $.02.
In addition to the period one prediction by participants, Table 27 also
shows management’s prediction of earnings per share estimates for period one
and the participants’ revisions of earnings per share after receiving
management’s prediction. Since management’s period one prediction is
mathematically derived based on the participants’ initial period one prediction, no
significant (t = .55, p = .461) difference exists between the two groups concerning
management’s predictions of earnings per share for the groups in period one.
H2 examines the reliance of participants’ on management’s forecast.
Table 2 demonstrated how the participants’ reliance on management’s forecast is
calculated. First the difference between the participants’ revised earnings per
share estimate and their initial earnings per share estimate is calculated, this is
called the difference in EPS estimates. The difference in EPS estimates is then
divided by the amount of surprise in management’s forecasts. The amount of
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surprise in management’s forecast is measured as the difference in
management’s prediction and the participant’s initial earnings per share estimate.
The result is the reliance on management’s forecast, which is used as a measure
of management’s credibility. For example, if management’s prediction was $.50
higher than the participant’s initial earnings per share estimate and the
participant raised his/her earnings per share estimate by $.25, then the reliance
on management’s forecast would be 50 percent.16
As Table 27 demonstrates participants in the high intention treatment
relied on management’s forecast and adjusted their earnings per share estimates
by about 34.3 percent ($.22/$.64) of management’s advocated change, while
participants in the no intention treatment only adjusted their earnings per share
estimates by 22.2 percent ($.14/$.63) of management’s advocated change. The
greater reliance on management’s forecast found in the high intention treatment
was consistent with the prediction of H2.

16

The percentage change from participant’s first and second estimate was considered as an
alternate measure of reliance. However, I believe measuring reliance as a percentage of the
change advocated by management makes the practical explanation of the results clearer. If
management’s advocated adjustment (the surprise) is 100%, this variable is a measure of how
much of that adjustment the participants believed was necessary.
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Table 27: Descriptive Statistics for the Reliance on Management’s Forecasts (H2)

Treatment
Condition

High
Intention

No
Intention

Participants’
Initial
EPS Estimate
Mean (Std.
dev.)
Min – Max

Surprise in
Management’s
Forecast **

Participants’
Revised
EPS Estimate
Mean (Std. dev.)
Min - Max

Participants’
Reliance on
Management’s
Forecast
Mean (Std. dev.)
Min – Max ***

Management's
EPS Forecast
Mean (Std. dev.)
Min – Max *

$1.99 (.115)
$1.50 -$2.250

$2.63 (.151)
$1.980 – $2.970

$.64 (.037)
$.480 -$.720

$2.21 (.264)
$1.550 – $2.870

.343 (.328)
0 - 1.225

$1.97 (.211)
$.500 - $2.20

$2.60 (.279)
$.660 - $2.90

$.63 (.068)
$.160 - $.704

$2.11 (.279)
$.500 – $2.600

.222 (.242)
0 - .987

* Calculated as Participant’s Initial Earnings Per Share * 1. 32
** Calculated as Management’s EPS Forecast – Participant’s Initial EPS Estimate
*** Calculated as (Participant’s Revised EPS – Participant’s Initial EPS) / Surprise in Management’s Forecast
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The impact of the different internal control letters on the reliance on
management’s forecast was tested using ANOVA. Four covariates were included
in the model. Recall from Table 16 that participants’ familiarity with SarbanesOxley (FRAUD SOX RELATIONSHIP), confidence in their earnings per share
estimates (CONFIDENCE), their prior history with investing (PREVIOUSLY
INVESTED), and their expectation of management inflating earnings (EXPECT
MANAGEMENT INFLATE EPS) were significantly correlated with the reliance on
management’s earnings per share estimates; thus, they were included as
controls for the test of H2.
Table 28 indicates the overall ANCOVA model used to test H2 was
statistically significant (F = 5.86, two-tailed p <.000). As reflected in Table 28, the
impact of the internal control letters was a statistically significant factor (F = 4.27,
one-tailed p = .021) in the difference in reliance on management’s forecast
between participants in the high intention treatment (34.3 percent) and
participants in the no intention treatment (22.2 percent), supporting H2. In
agreement with the information provided in Table 16, all four covariates were
significantly (alpha of .10) associated with reliance on management’s forecast.

111

Table 28: ANCOVA Test of Reliance on Management’s Forecast (H2)
Sum of
Variable
DF Squares
Mean Squares
F Statistic
Internal Control Letter
1
0.305
0.305
4.27
FRAUD SOX
RELATIONSHIP
1
0.451
0.451
6.31
CONFIDENCE
1
0.491
0.491
6.88
EXPECT MANAGEMENT
INFLATE EPS
1
0.693
0.693
9.71
PREVIOUSLY
INVESTED
1
0.242
0.242
3.39
Model
Error
Corrected Total

5
118
123

2.090
8.427
10.518

0.418
0.071

P-Value
0.021*

5.86

0.014
0.010
0.002
0.066
0.000

Internal Control Letter: Treatment given with either high intention tone or no intention tone.
FRAUD SOX RELATIONSHIP: Question asked the relevance of Sarbanes-Oxley to fraud.
CONFIDENCE: Question asked participants their confidence in their earnings per share
predictions.
EXPECT MANAGEMENT INFLATE EPS: Question asked participants if they expected
management to inflate their earnings per share predictions.
PREVIOUSLY INVESTED: Question asked participants if they had ever made an investment in
the stock market.
* P-Value adjusted for one-tailed test.

Three of the covariates were negatively correlated with the participants’
reliance on management’s forecast and one covariate was positively correlated
with reliance on management’s forecast. The three negatively correlated
covariates were all significant with respect to the model and included participants’
feelings regarding the Sarbanes Oxley Act (FRAUD SOX RELATIONSHIP)
(F=6.31, two-tailed p= .014), their confidence (CONFIDENCE) in their earnings
per share predictions (F= 6.88, two-tailed p= .010), and their expectations that
management would inflate earnings (EXPECT MANAGEMENT INFLATE EPS)
(F= 9.71, two-tailed p= .002). As the response values to these questions
increased, participants’ reliance on management’s forecasts decreased.
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Intuitively this made sense for the confidence (CONFIDENCE) variable and the
expectation of management to inflate its earnings per share estimates (EXPECT
MANAGEMENT INFLATE EPS). The more confident participants were in their
selection of earnings per share the less likely they were to revise their forecast.
Also, the more participants expected management to inflate its earnings per
share estimates, the less likely they were to revise their own earnings per share
estimates after receiving management’s. There is no intuitive reasoning for
participant’s beliefs about the relevance on the Sarbanes Oxley Act (FRAUD
SOX RELATIONSHIP) to reduce their reliance on management’s forecasts.
Participants’ prior investing experience (PREVIOUSLY INVESTED) was
significant (F= 3.39, two-tailed p=.066) and positively correlated with the reliance
on management’s forecast, indicating participants with more investing experience
tended to rely more on management’s forecasts.
4.5.2 Testing of H3 and H4
For period one, it was predicted that a letter from management with the
high intention tone would lead to greater reliance on management’s earnings per
share forecast. In part, this was due to the fact that the participants in period one
had no prior information regarding management’s past forecast accuracy. Prior
research has shown that management’s past forecast accuracy can impact
management’s credibility ratings (Williams 1996; Hirst et al. 1999). When
management fails to forecast accurately its credibility drops and so too does the
market’s reliance on management’s forecasts. All of the participants in period two
of the study knew of management’s failure to accurately forecast its earnings per
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share in period one. Therefore, it was expected that all of the participants’ ratings
of management’s credibility would drop because management failed to meet its
predicted earnings per share estimate from period one. Period two of the study
examines the impact of manipulating management’s tone in a communication
with investors when investors have prior knowledge of management’s inability to
forecast accurately. For H3 and H4 the intention factor of management’s
credibility is manipulated using the tone of a communication from management to
recipients who have received only inaccurate past forecasts from management.
In period one, half of the participants in the study either received management’s
statement of internal controls with a high or no intention manipulation. In period
two, the participants received a letter from management communicating the
actual earnings results from period one of the study. The intention factor of
credibility was manipulated in the actual earnings letter at either a high intention
or no intention tone.
4.5.2.1
Two (H3)

The Difference in Credibility Ratings from Period One to Period

Hypothesis three examines the impact of the communication tone (high
intention vs. no intention) in the financial results letter on the difference in
participants’ rating of management’s credibility from period one to period two.
When management failed to meet its forecast, the prediction was that
management would experience a smaller difference in credibility ratings from
participants who received an earnings letter with the high intention manipulation.
Each participant completed the credibility scale twice; once after reading
the internal control letter from management and once after reading the letter from
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management explaining the company’s failure to forecast earnings per share. To
test H3, participants’ ratings of management’s overall credibility in period two
were subtracted from participants’ overall ratings of credibility in period one.
Table 29 presents the credibility rating scores for period one and period
two, as well as the difference in overall credibility ratings from period one to
period two. As can be seen in Table 29, participants who received the high
intention financial results letter in period two reduced their rating of
management’s credibility less than participants who received the no intention
financial results letter. The participants who received the high intention financial
results letter in period two rated management’s mean credibility 7.513 in period
one and 7.009 in period two; thus, the decline in management’s credibility ratings
is .504. The participants who received the no intention financial results letter in
period two rated management’s credibility 7.461 in period one and 6.594 in
period two; thus, the decline in credibility ratings is .867. The participants in the
no intention treatment reduced their ratings of management credibility by more
than participants in the high intention treatment.
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Table 29: Descriptive Statistics for the Difference in Credibility Ratings from Period One
to Period Two (H3)
Credibility Ratings for Period One and Period Two and the Difference in Credibility
Ratings from Period One to Period Two
Period One Credibility Period Two Credibility Difference in Credibility
Rating
Rating
Ratings
Treatment
Condition
Mean (Std. dev.)
Mean (Std. dev.)
Mean (Std. dev.)
Min - Max
Min - Max
Min - Max
7.513 (1.450)
7.009 (1.876)
0.504* (1.466)
High
Intention
4.222 - 11.000
3.281 - 10.940
-4.333 - 2.166
7.461 (1.431)
No
Intention
5.000 - 10.611
62 participants in each treatment condition
* Positive means indicate a gain of credibility

6.594 (1.764)
3.333 - 10.500

0.867* (1.017)
-3.500 - .500

Prior testing (Table 17 and 18) revealed that two covariates should be
included in the analysis of H3. The two covariates are study of Sarbanes-Oxley
(STUDIED SOX) and investment in mutual fund (INVESTED IN MUTUAL
FUND). These covariates are included in the ANCOVA model reported in Table
30, which displays the results of testing the difference in credibility ratings
between the high intention and no intention tone financial results letters for period
two. The model is significant (F= 5.55, two-tail p=.002). In support of H3, the
financial results letter indicates a significant (F= 2.66, one-tailed p = .053)
difference in credibility ratings.
Both covariates were significant with respect to the model. Student’s
history with studying Sarbanes-Oxley was significantly (F= 4.17, two-tailed p=
.044) associated with the difference in credibility ratings, indicating that more
knowledge of Sarbanes-Oxley led to larger drops in rating management’s
credibility. There was also a significant (F= 9.06, two-tailed p= .032) difference in
responses for students who had previously invested in mutual funds. Those with
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previous investment experience were also more likely to drop their rating of
management’s credibility from period one to period two.
Table 30: ANCOVA Test of Difference in Credibility Ratings (H3)

Variable
Financial Results Letter
STUDIED SOX
INVESTED IN MUTUAL FUND

DF
1
1
1

Sum of
Squares
3.866
6.059
13.149

Model
Error
Corrected Total

3
120
123

24.147
174.160
205.486

Mean Squares
3.866
6.059
13.149

F Statistic
2.66
4.17
9.06

P-Value
0.053*
0.044
0.032

8.049
1.451

5.55

0.002

* One tailed P-Value
Financial Results Letter: Treatment given with either high intention tone or no intention tone.
STUDIED SOX: Question asked participants if they studied Sarbanes-Oxley.
INVESTED IN MUTUAL FUND: Question asked participants if they had invested in mutual
funds

4.5.2.2

The Difference in Reliance on Management’s Forecast (H4)

Hypothesis four examines the difference in reliance on management’s
forecast from period one to period two of the study. It was predicted that the
communication tone (high intention vs. no intention) of the financial results letter
would impact the difference in reliance on management’s forecast from period
one to period two. While H3 examines the loss in the creditability rating scores
from period one to period two, H4 examines the difference in reliance on
management’s forecast from period one to period two. It was predicted that
participants who received the high intention financial results letter would have a
smaller decline in reliance on management’s forecasts after receiving
management’s estimate than the participants who received the financial results
letter with no intention manipulation.
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In each period of the study participants’ reliance on management’s
forecasts was indicated by the revision in their initial earnings per share
estimates after receiving management’s forecast. As defined in the testing of H2
and demonstrated in Table 2, the reliance on management’s forecasts is first
measured by subtracting the participants’ revised earnings per share estimate
from their initial earnings per share estimate, and then dividing that difference by
the amount of surprise in management’s forecasts. The amount of surprise in
management’s forecast is measured as the difference in management’s
prediction and the participant’s initial earnings per share prediction.17 The result
of the calculation is the percentage change in forecasts, which is used as a
measure of reliance on management’s forecasts. The reliance on management’s
forecast was made for both periods one and two and the difference in reliance on
management’s forecast (H4) is then measured as the percentage change
(revision) from period two subtracted from the percentage change (revision) in
period one.
Figure 1 demonstrates the research model used in the study. Only two
factors influence the amount of investors’ belief revision: surprise and credibility.
By holding the amount of surprise constant and then comparing the difference in
the amount of belief revision between period one and period two of the study it is
possible to attribute the belief revision to the decrease or loss in management’s
credibility. For example, if a participant had relied on management’s forecast and

17

The percentage change in participant’s earnings per share estimates is calculated as (Revised
earnings per share - Initial earning per share) / (Management’s predicted earnings per share –
Initial earnings per share.)
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revised his/her earnings per share estimate by 30 percent of what management
advocated in period one and only 20 percent in period two, the participant’s
reliance on management’s information dropped. Since the amount of surprise
was held constant the change in beliefs must be due to a drop in credibility as
less reliance was placed on management’s surprise information in period two.
Table 31 provides the descriptive statistics for the difference in reliance on
management’s forecast between groups. The participants who received the
financial statement letter with the high intention manipulation revised their
earnings per share estimates in period one by 24.0 percent of the change
advocated by management. In period two they revised their earnings per share
estimates by only 10.8 percent of management’s advocated change. Overall, the
participants who received the high intention financial statement letter had a
decline in reliance on management’s forecasts of 13.2 percent. In contrast, the
participants who received the financial statement letter with no intention
manipulation revised their earnings per share estimates in period one by 31.3
percent of the change advocated by management, and in period two they revised
their earnings per share estimates by 15.7 percent of management’s advocated
change. Overall the participants who received the no intention financial statement
letter had a decline in reliance on management’s forecasts of 15.5 percent from
period one to period two.
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Table 31: Descriptive Statistics for the Difference in Reliance on Management’s
Forecasts (H4)
Reliance on Management’s Forecast for Period One & Period Two and the Reduction in
Reliance Between Periods
Period One
Period Two
Mean Difference in
EPS Adjustment
EPS Adjustment
EPS Adjustment
Treatment
Condition
Mean (Std. dev.)
Mean (Std. dev.)
Mean (Std. dev.)
Min – Max
Min - Max
Min - Max
0.240 (.278)
0.108 (.149)
0.132* (.267)
High
Intention
0 - 1.225
0 - 0.614
-0.510 - 0.864
.313 (.304)
No
Intention
0 – 1.000
62 participants in each treatment condition
* Positive means indicate a gain of credibility

.157 (.220)
0 - 1.007

.156* (.297)
-0.625 - 0.792

To test H4, an ANCOVA model was used to determine if the difference
between the groups receiving the high intention letter and the no intention letter
was statistically significant. The dependent variable used in the model was the
difference in reliance on management’s forecasts from period one to period two
and the independent variable was the financial statement letter. One variable
was included as a covariate (useful) to control for differences found between
participants’ estimates of earnings per share and the actual earnings per share
for period one.18 Table 32 displays the results of the ANCOVA model. The model
is significant (F= 100.77, two-tailed p-value <.000). While the model is significant,
the financial statement letter is insignificant (F = 1.34, one-tailed p=.125).

18

For more information on the useful variable refer to section 4.4.2.8.4 and Table 19.
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Table 32: ANCOVA Results for Difference in Reliance on Management’s Forecast (H4)
Sum of
Mean
Variables
DF Squares
Squares
F Statistic
P-Value
Financial Results Letter
1
0.040
0.040
1.34
.125*
Useful
1
6.083
6.083
200.99
< .000
Model
Error
Corrected Total

2
121
123

6.099
3.662
9.761

3.049
0.030

100.77

< .000

Financial Results Letter: Given at two levels high intention and no intention tone.
Useful: The usefulness of the period one forecast.
* One tailed P-Value

The covariate (useful) was found to be significant (F=200.99, two-tailed
p<.000) and had the greatest influence on the participant’s loss of credibility in
period two. The useful variable measured the difference between participants’
final earnings per share estimate in period one and the actual earnings per share
for the company. Positive values of the useful variable indicate that participants’
final earnings per share estimate was above the actual earnings per share for the
company. Negative values of the useful variable indicated participants’ final
earnings per share estimates were below the actual earnings per share for the
company. Participants with larger positive values of the useful variable relied
less on management’s forecast in period two.
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4.6 Post Hoc Analysis
4.6.1 Overview of Post Hoc Analysis
In this section of the study I will examine other impacts of the treatments
on participants’ judgment and decision making. The post hoc analysis will
proceed as follows. In period one, H1 predicted that the internal control letter
would impact the rating of management’s credibility. Since the “management
credibility” construct actually comprises three sub-factors—intention,
trustworthiness, and expertise—the impact of the internal control letter (high
intention vs. no intention) on each of these three sub-factors will be examined in
the post-hoc analysis.
Also discussed will be the unintended treatment created by the design of
the study. The impact of the unintended treatment on the results of period two
was included in the model for H4 as a covariate called useful. The useful variable
will be examined further in this section.
4.6.2 The Impact of Altering Tone on the Perception of Management’s
Credibility
When the participants filled out the credibility scale in period one, they
completed 18 questions that load on three sub-factors of credibility. In period
one, an average credibility score comprised of all 18 questions was used to
examine the differences between groups. In this section a MANOVA test is used
to determine the impact of the management internal control letter on each of the
average scores for the three sub-factors of credibility (intention, trustworthiness
and expertise). The results of the ANOVA tests are presented in Table 33. Recall
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from Table 25, participants in the high intention treatment gave management a
mean credibility rating of 7.89 compared to those in the no intention treatment
who rated management’s average credibility at 7.01. These results were similar
for the three sub-factors of credibility. With respect to the intention factor of
credibility participants in the high intention treatment rated management’s
intention an average of 7.66 while participants in the no intention treatment rated
management’s intention an average of 6.66. With respect to management’s
trustworthiness, participants in the high intention treatment rated management’s
trustworthiness 7.68 on average while participants in the no intention treatment
rated management’s trustworthiness 7.02 on average. There was also a
significant difference with respect to management’s expertise ratings. The
participants in the high intention group rated management’s expertise an average
of 8.31 while participants in the no intention group rated management’s expertise
7.58 on average. The letters from management with a manipulated intention tone
significantly (p = .05) impacted each of the sub-factors of management’s
credibility.
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Table 33: Descriptive Statistics for Sub-Factors of Credibility

Treatment

High Intention

No Intention

Comparison

Credibility Question
(1=Less 11=More)

Mean (Std. Dev.)

Mean (Std. Dev.)

F Statistic

p-value*

Average Intention

7.669 (1.768)

6.664 (1.311)

12.93

< 0.000

Average Trust

7.682 (1.679)

7.024 (1.303)

5.95

0.008

Average Expertise

8.306 (1.522)

7.578 (1.400)

7.7

0.003

* One tailed p-value

4.6.3 Examination of Period Two Results as a Function of the Usefulness of
Period One’s Prediction
In period two, it was expected that the participants who received the
financial statement results letter with the high intention tone of credibility would
have a smaller change in reliance on management’s forecast than the
participants who received the financial results letter with no intention tone. Upon
further examination it was determined that the most significant factor impacting
the results for H4 was the period one forecast.
The study was originally designed as a one period study examining the
impact of altering the tone of the communication from management to investors
on investors’ ratings of management’s credibility and reliance on management’s
forecast. The design of the study was then expanded to a second period. For
period two, it was decided that for both treatment groups, management would fail
to meet its forecasted results for period one, thus lowering the credibility of
management. A written communication from management would be used to
attempt to reduce the loss of credibility resulting from failing to meet forecasted
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earnings. It was expected that altering the tone of the written communication
would reduce the loss of credibility.
In period one of the study, participants were allowed to freely pick their
initial earnings per share estimates, and management’s prediction of earnings
per share, as well as the actual period one results, were based on a constant
percentage of each participant’s initial earnings per share estimate.
Management’s forecasts were always 132 percent of the participants’ initial
earnings per share estimates and actual results were always 109 percent of the
initial earnings per share estimate. For example, if one participant predicted
earnings per share in period one of $1.00, management’s prediction of earnings
per share would be $1.32 and the actual results for the period would be reported
as $1.09. A second participant could select an initial earnings per share estimate
of $2.00 and be told management had predicted earnings per share of $2.64 with
the actual results for period one at $2.18. The comparisons across all treatment
groups were made based on percentage changes and not absolute dollar
amounts. So if the participant in example one had revised his/her initial estimate
to $1.16 and the participant in example two had revised his/her initial estimate to
$2.32 then both participants had revised their predictions by 50 percent of
management’s recommendation. A comparison of initial earnings per share
estimates by participants in period one revealed no difference between the
groups in the high and low condition. Therefore, both groups effectively began
period two at the same point since the actual period one earnings were based on
the participant’s initial earnings per share estimate from period one.
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While participants in period one began the study at about the same place
with respect to earnings per share estimates (no difference in their earnings per
share between groups), they were not at the same place at the conclusion of
period one of the study. The participants in the high intention treatment had
revised their initial earnings per share estimates (34 percent) more than the
participants in the no intention treatment (22 percent). An example of the
difference caused by the revision in period one can be explained as follows.
Using two participants “X1” and “X2,” assume X1 is assigned to the high intention
treatment in period one and X2 is assigned to the no intention treatment in period
one. Both X1 and X2 predict their initial earnings per share estimate as $1.00.
They will both receive the same earnings per share estimate from management
of $1.32 and actual earnings for period one will be reported as $1.09. Suppose,
participant X1 revised his earnings per share by 34 percent of the surprise
information given by management or $.11 (34 percent x $.32 = $.11) while
participant X2 revised her initial prediction by 22 percent of the surprise
information given by management or $.08 (22 percent x $.32= $.08). When the
actual results for period one are reported at $1.09, participant X1, in the high
intention group, had an estimate that was higher ($1.11) than the actual results of
$1.09 while X2 had a prediction that was lower ($1.08) than the actual results. It
was assumed that all participants would begin the period using the actual
earnings from period one as a basis for the period two tasks. The difference
between each participant’s period one revised estimate and the actual earnings
per share for period one might inadvertently have impacted the effectiveness of
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the treatments in period two. The difference found between the revised period
one estimates and actual period one results impacted both participants’ initial
earnings predictions for period two and the amount of reliance on management’s
forecasts for period two.
The impact of this unintended variable can actually be explained with prior
findings from accounting literature. Williams (1996) examined the relationship
between the usefulness of prior earnings forecasts by management and analyst
revisions to current forecasts. In her study, Williams gives an example of the
usefulness of a prior forecast where two companies (firm A and firm B) made
earnings predictions of $2.75 and $2.50, respectively. The actual earnings per
share of each company was $3.00, so Firm A’s forecast was deemed more
accurate. To differentiate accuracy from usefulness, Williams furthers the
example by supposing that analysts had estimates of earnings for Firm A of
$2.90 ($.10 lower than actual earnings) and Firm B of $2.00 ($1.00 lower than
the actual earnings). For Firm A, management’s forecast was $.15 lower than
analysts’ forecast and for Firm B management’s forecast was $.50 higher than
analysts’ forecasts. Thus, in this example, Firm B’s forecast was more useful to
analysts since it provided more information based on analysts’ current level of
belief, even if it was not more accurate.
Data from the current study can be used to test Williams (1998) notion of a
difference between forecast usefulness and forecast accuracy. In period one of
this study management’s forecasts and the actual results for period one were a
fixed percentage of each participant’s initial earnings per share estimate. The
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accuracy of management’s forecast was constant between all of the participants
in the study. What varied between participants in period one of the study was the
participants’ revised expectations of earnings per share. Therefore, for each
participant we can determine the usefulness of management’s prediction by
examining the difference between each participant’s revised (or expected)
earnings per share and the actual earnings per share for period one.
Participants who were in the high intention treatment for period one had a
mean difference of .033 above the actual earnings per share, while participants
who were in the no intention treatment in period one had a mean difference of
.035 below the actual earnings per share. This difference between the two
treatments was statistically significant (F= 4.15, one-tailed p=.022).
In examining the percentage of accuracy for management’s prediction,
both of the treatment groups had management predictions that were identical.
Management’s initial prediction of earnings was 132 percent of participants’ initial
earnings per share estimate and the actual earnings were 109 percent of the
participants’ initial earnings per share estimate for both groups.
The expectation of earnings per share for the participants in the high
intention group was above the actual earnings per share for period one, while the
expectations of earnings per share for the no intention tone group was lower than
the actual earnings per share for period one. The data indicate that participants
whose expectations were above the actual earnings per share in period one
predicted lower earnings per share estimates for period two but they also did not
revise their earnings per share estimates in period two as much as the
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participants whose expectations of earnings per share were below the actual
results for period one. Stated differently, participant’s who had experienced
management’s earnings per share estimates that were below the actual earnings
per share estimates in period one found the period two management forecast of
earnings per share to be more useful. Since accuracy was held constant
between treatment conditions, these results indicate that the usefulness of the
forecast and not the forecast accuracy was driving the results in period two.
These findings add some support for the Williams (1998) proposition that
forecast usefulness and forecast accuracy are two separate constructs.
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5.0 Summary and Conclusion
5.1 Summary of Study
This study was designed to examine the impact of the intention factor of
management credibility on investors’ decision making. Credibility is a latent
variable with three sub-factors: expertise, trustworthiness, and intentions. The
intention factor of credibility is a perception variable that measures perceived
understanding, empathy, and responsiveness of a communicator. The study
manipulated management’s intention via written communications with
participants. The impact of manipulating the perception of management’s
intention factor of credibility was then examined using both ratings of
management’s credibility and by examining participant’s reliance on
management’s forecasts of earnings per share estimates.
There were four hypotheses tested in this study. In H1 and H2 participants
had no information regarding management’s prior forecast history. In H3 and H4
the changes from period one to period two were examined after participant’s
experienced management failing to meet its forecast from period one.
As stated above, in period one of the study, participants had no prior
knowledge of management’s forecast accuracy. The participants, representing
average investors, were given background financial information regarding the
company. Included in the financial information was a letter from management
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regarding the effectiveness of internal controls for the company as required by
the PCAOB. One half of the participants received a letter that had a high
intention tone, while the other half received a letter with no intention tone. H1
predicted that participants who received the high intention tone letter would rate
management’s credibility higher than participants who received the letter from
management with no intention manipulation. The findings from the study
supported the prediction of H1, in that participants who received the high
intention letter from management rated management’s credibility significantly
higher than the participant’s who received the letter with no intention tone. These
findings were statistically significant at an alpha of .10. This suggests that
management can increase its credibility by communicating with a tone that
implies understanding, empathy, and responsiveness to investors’ concerns.
In addition to testing the rating of management’s credibility, a second
hypothesis was also tested in period one. Participants in both groups (high
intention vs. no intention tone) completed a task in which they predicted earnings
per share for the company for period one. After making their earnings per share
predictions they received management’s prediction of earnings per share.
Participants were then given an opportunity to revise their earnings per share
prediction. H2 predicted that participant’s who had received the high intention
letter would rely more on management’s predictions by revising their earnings
per share estimates closer to management’s than those participants who
received the letter from management with the no intentions manipulation.
Support was found for H2 as participants who had received the high intention
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treatment revised their earnings per share to a greater degree than those who
received the letter with no intention tone.
In period two of the study, H3 and H4 were tested. Period two of the study
begins with the participants from period one receiving a letter from management
stating the actual earnings per share for period one. For all participants
management failed to meet its forecasted estimate. Failing to meet its forecasted
estimate of earnings per share should reduce management’s credibility (Williams
1996; Hirst et al. 1999). The manipulation for H3 and H4 had one half of the
participants receive the earnings letter with a high intention tone while the other
half of the participants received a letter with the no intention tone. Differences in
credibility ratings and reliance on management’s forecasts from period one to
period two of the study were tested.
Hypothesis three predicted that the participants who received the financial
results letter from management with the high intention tone would not lower their
rating of management’s credibility as much than those who received the financial
results letter from management with the no intention tone. The hypothesis was
tested by having each participant rate management using the same credibility
scale in both periods one and two. To compare the difference in credibility
ratings, a difference score was calculated using period one and two credibility
ratings. Higher difference scores indicated greater loss of credibility. In looking at
the difference in credibility ratings between the treatment groups (Table 29) a
statistically significant difference was found, providing support for H3 in that
participants who received the high intention financial results letter reduced their
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perceived credibility of management less than participant’s receiving the no
intention tone letter.
In addition to testing the difference in credibility ratings between periods
one and two, the difference in the reliance on management’s forecast was also
tested between period one and period two (H4). It was expected that when
management failed to meet its earnings per share estimates that participants
would reduce the amount by which they relied on management’s forecasts. H4
predicted that participants who received the earnings letter with the high intention
tone would reduce their reliance on management’s forecast less than participants
who received the earnings letter with no intention tone. However, the results
indicated that the tone of the financial results letter was an insignificant factor in
determining the loss of credibility from period one to period two of the study.
Thus, there was no support for H4.
Table 34 summarizes the overall results of the study. The study found
support for H1 and H2 suggesting that management can influence the perception
of its credibility by the tone it uses when communicating with investors. The
increase in credibility was seen in both participants’ ratings of management’s
credibility and the reliance on management’s forecast when predicting earnings
per share. The study also found support for H3, which posited that when
management fails to meet its earnings per share estimates, it can mitigate its
loss of credibility by altering the tone of its written communications with investors.
The impact of the financial results letter did significantly impact the difference in
credibility ratings from periods one and two of the study. However, the financial
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results letter was not a significant factor in the amount of reliance on
management’s forecasts (H4) as there was no significant difference between the
treatment groups in period two.
An unintentional finding of the study involves the usefulness of
management’s forecast. After receiving information from management,
participants in the high intention treatment in year one had revised their earnings
per share estimates above the actual earnings per share for the period while
participants in the no intention treatment had revised their earnings per share
estimates below the actual earnings per share estimates for the period. The
impact of the difference between the year one treatment groups could be seen in
the revisions of earnings per share predictions in year two. Participants who
over-relied on management by selecting an estimate of earnings per share
higher than the actual earnings per share for period one seemed to rely less on
management’s forecast in period two. Participants who under-relied on
management’s forecast, and who subsequently had earnings per share
estimates lower than the actual earnings per share for period one, tended to rely
more on management’s forecast in period two. This finding gives support to the
findings from Williams (1996) who used market data to determine if the
usefulness of management’s forecast was more important than the accuracy of
management’s forecast.
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Table 34: Summary of Hypotheses and Findings
Independent
Hypothesis Dependent Variable Variable

H1

Credibility Rating

Internal Control
Letter

Reliance on
Management’s
Internal Control
H2
Forecast
Letter
Difference in
Earnings Results
H3
Credibility Rating
Letter
Difference in
Reliance on
Management’s
Earnings Results
Letter
H4
Forecast
* Two tailed test
** One tailed test (adjusted for directional hypotheses)

Covariates
FRAUD
SOX RELATIONSHIP
CONFIDENCE
ASNO2
FAMILIARITY
INVESTED IN MUTUAL FUND
FRAUD
SOX RELATIONSHIP
CONFIDENCE
EXPECT MANAGEMENT- INFLATE
EPS
STUDIED SOX
INVESTED IN MUTUAL FUND

Useful

135

Overall
Model*

Hypothesized
Effect**

Table
Reference

F= 7.94
p<.000

F = 6.49
p =.006

Table 26

F = 5.86
P <.000
F = 8.049
p = .002

F = 4.27
p = .021
F = 2.66
p = .053

F= 100.77
p = <.000

F = 1.34
p = .125

Table 28
Table 30

Table 32

5.2

Limitations
This study was designed as a laboratory experiment. With appropriate

controls for the effects of extraneous variables, the laboratory experiment sought
to maintain high internal validity. However, laboratory experiments may have
lower external validity than field studies in which a real business task is being
performed by experienced decision makers. The lower external validity might
limit the generalizability of the findings. The experiment was designed as an
abstraction of a task an investor might face. Participants were given limited
background regarding a fictitious company. Although the limited information in
the task reduces the external validity of the study’s findings, it is necessary to
reduce the amount of variation for each participant to maintain internal validity at
as high a level as possible. In this task all participants were given the same
background information and financial statements. The only differences between
experimental materials were the treatment effects. Therefore, given that
participants were randomly assigned to treatments, any observed variation in
participants’ responses should be due to either random (uncontrolled) individual
differences between participants or the treatment conditions. Individual
differences can be controlled through randomizing the participants into
treatments and analyzing the tested differences post hoc using demographic
questions as possible covariates. The individual differences measured and tested
as covariates in this study did not alter the study’s findings.
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The use of students as participants in experiments can sometimes pose a
threat to validity. However, in this study the use of student subjects does not
represent a limitation. The study was designed to examine a theoretical link
between management’s perceived intentions based on the tone of its written
communications and investors’ willingness to rely on management’s guidance.
Prior research (Ashton and Kramer 1980; Libby et al. 2002) indicates that when a
theoretical link is being examined students can be appropriate participants. Even
if this study employed professional stock analysts, the amount or percentage of
their adjustments to their earnings per share predictions could not be used to
measure or predict future adjustment percentages but could only be used to
show support for the theory that future judgments will be impacted by perceptions
of management’s credibility.
Another limitation in this study is a problem in the design of the study that
was found only after all of the data were collected. The study was originally
designed as a one period study to test the impact of altering the intention tone on
the perceptions and amount of revision in estimates when participants had no
prior knowledge of management’s prior forecast accuracy. It was decided that
since the participants would complete the study in a short amount of time, it
would be reasonable to extend the study to examine the impact of altering the
tone of communications when the participants have prior knowledge that
management has failed to forecast accurately. In period one of the study the
participants were allowed to select their initial earnings per share estimates. To
control for the amount of surprise in management’s information between
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participants, the forecast given by management was calculated as a percentage
of the participant’s initial earnings per share estimate (132 percent). Participants
were then allowed to alter their forecast after receiving management’s estimate.
When the study was expanded to include the second period, a decision was
made to hold the accuracy of management’s period one prediction to 109 percent
of the participant’s initial earnings per share estimate. Thus, all participants would
receive forecasts from management that were inaccurate by a constant
percentage of management’s earnings per share estimate. What was not
considered in the design of the study was how the difference between
participants’ revised earnings per share estimates and the actual results of
earnings per share for the period would impact participants’ future reliance on
management’s forecast. The participants who were in the high intention condition
in period one revised their earnings per share estimate closer to management’s
earnings per share estimate than the participants in the no intention treatment.
Management’s estimates of earnings per share as well as the actual results of
the period were calculated based on the participants’ initial earnings per share
estimates. There was no difference between the treatment groups in the initial
earnings per share estimates, but there were differences in the revised earnings
per share estimates. When the actual results for period one were reported, the
mean earnings per share estimate for the participants in the high intention
treatment were higher than the actual earnings per share for the period, while the
mean earnings per share estimates for the participants in the no intention
treatment were lower than the actual earnings per share for the period. As a
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result, the participants did not begin period two on an even basis. The difference
between the actual earnings per share for period one and the participants’
revised earnings per share estimates in period one drove the behavior of the
participants in period two more than any of the treatments. The flaw in the design
of the study may explain the lack of findings in period two. The unintended effect
was much more powerful than the treatment effect designed in the study.
5.3

Contributions
The findings from this study offer contributions to accounting research,

accounting policy makers and to the psychology literature on persuasion and
credibility. In accounting research, this study expands upon two prior research
streams in accounting. With respect to the introduction of credibility scales in
accounting, this study builds upon the findings of Mercer (2004, 2005) by
expanding the two factor model of credibility, consisting of expertise and
trustworthiness, to the three factor model of credibility, which includes the
intention factor. The findings from period one of this study suggest that the
intention factor of credibility should also be considered when measuring
management’s credibility.
Also with respect to accounting research, an unintended consequence of
the design of this study (as discussed in the limitations and post hoc analysis
sections) offers experimental support for the findings of Williams (1996) in which
the usefulness of a prior earnings forecast issued by management impacts the
reliance on future forecasts. While prior research had used the accuracy of prior
forecasts, Williams (1996) suggested that the usefulness of a forecast and not its
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accuracy would determine future belief revision. Williams (1996) defined
usefulness as a forecast which improved upon initial earnings expectations. In
this study the accuracy of management’s earnings per share estimates were
identical between treatment groups, however, the participants who had predicted
the earnings per share higher than the actual results (the high intention treatment
group) relied less on management predictions in period two of the study than the
participants with predictions of earnings per share less than the actual results
(the no intention period one group). These findings indicate that forecast
usefulness as opposed to accuracy is a better indicator of future forecast
revisions when management issues guidance.
This study contributes to accounting policy making. The PCAOB’s (2004)
Auditing Standard No. 2, “An Audit of Internal Control over Financial Reporting
Performed in Conjunction with an Audit of Financial Statements” leaves the
wording of the report up to management. The choice to leave the wording of a
mandatory report to management could lead users to different decisions based
on the wording used in the management reports. In this study altering the tone of
communications with management was enough to impact management’s
credibility ratings and the amount of reliance participants placed on
management’s forecast estimates. These findings suggest that more research
should be conducted to determine the impact of wording on the manner in which
decision-makers use accounting reports. It is important to note that the different
reports did not impact the participant’s initial earnings per share estimates, only
the amount by which participants relied on management forecasts. While this
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seems insignificant, it suggests that research looking at the impact of different
types of reports, such as differences in audit reports versus reviews and
compilations, may not have been properly designed to measure the impact of the
reports on investors’ decision-making.19 Many of these studies failed to find
differences between decision makers when making immediate decisions such as
the decision to lend, the interest rate at which to lend, and the maximum loan
amounts (Strawser 1994). However, these studies did not examine how the
wording of the reports impacted other constructs such as management’s
credibility. In this study management’s credibility was affected by the letters
included in the financial statements, yet there were no differences between
groups in their initial estimates of earnings per share for the company. The
participant’s did however, show differences in their reactions to future decisions
when given information by management. The lending decisions in prior studies
were found to be based on the solvency of the company more than any of the
reporting formats (Blackwell et al. 1998). Had the prior studies examined the
impact of the different accounting reports on the bankers’ reactions to future
events they may have found differences in how the bankers’ reacted to
explanations of these future events based on the type of report the accountants
issued to management.
This study also contributes to the persuasion and credibility literature in
psychology by further validating the three factor model of credibility presented by
McCroskey and Teven (1999). Additionally, a task was examined where the
perception of credibility (as measured by the McCroskey and Teven Credibility
19

See Strawser 1991,1994 for a review of prior research.
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Scale) and actual decisions were compared when participants viewed reports
that differed in the tone used to communicate information. The task used in
presented an example of a single factor of credibility (intention) was manipulated
and measured successfully. Prior psychological research has had difficulty in
finding tasks to manipulate that test the individual sub-factors of the credibility
model (O'Keefe 1990).
5.4 Future Research
Other scales of credibility could be used to examine how different factors
may impact auditor credibility. Testing could be done to determine if wording in
auditor reports could impact the perceived intentions of the auditors and thus
impact auditors’ overall credibility. The standard wording in audit reports may
reduce the impact those reports have on decision-makers.
This study found support for the assertion that different forms of
management’s statement on internal controls impact investors’ judgments.
Currently, under Auditing Standard No. 2 management is allowed considerable
latitude in choosing its wording in the required statement on internal controls.
Future research could be conducted in this area to determine if standard reports
with prescribed (or constrained) wording would allow for more consistent investor
interpretations of the reports. Also, different standard reports could be explored
to determine which format investors prefer.
Future research could also focus on testing the impact of tone on actual
investors and/or institutional investors. This study was conducted using students
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who are a proxy for investors. Actual investor responses may alter the
conclusions reached in this study.
The model of credibility including the factors known to mediate the impact
of credibility as discussed in the appendix should be examined further. Path
analyses can be used to examine if the covariates in the model follow the
direction and strength of the theory.
5.5 Conclusion
This study presents strong evidence that the tone of communications used
by management may impact the participants’ ratings of management’s credibility
and the amount of reliance participants place on management’s forecasts. The
robustness of this finding was also tested after management had failed to meet
its earnings per share forecast. After failing to make a forecast, the tone of
communications was able to mitigate the reduction in management’s credibility
ratings by participants. The tone of communications was not able to mitigate the
loss of credibility as measured by participants’ reliance on management’s
forecasts in period two of the study.
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Appendices

Appendix A: Moderating Factors That Influence Credibility or Its Impact on
Belief Revision
The model of credibility’s impact on belief revision used in the study accounts
only for factors that are introduced in the study. There are other factors known to
affect credibility or to impact the effect credibility has on belief revision. This
Appendix describes these factors as mediators and moderators. Mediators are
variables that will affect the level of credibility. Moderators will not affect
credibility but rather impact the role credibility plays in belief revision.
Mediating Variables of Credibility
Two variables that can impact a person’s credibility are knowledge biases
and reporting biases. Eagly and Wood (1978) propose that the position taken by
a communicator will interact with the message recipient’s expectations of the
communicator position. This interaction affects the message recipient’s perceived
credibility of the communicator. These expectancy biases are referred to as
knowledge bias and reporting bias (Eagly et al. 1978). Both of these biases and
their expected effect on credibility are diagramed in Figure 3 and will be
discussed in the following sections.
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Figure 3. Eagly, Wood and Chaiken (1978) Reporting Bias and Knowledge Bias

Knowledge Bias
Message recipients may expect a communicator to advocate a certain
biased position based on the communicator’s background. Eagly and Wood
(1978) note the influences on a communicator can be internal or external.
Internal influences are influences such as a person’s biological makeup (skin
color, body composition, and gender). For example, people with a particular
ethnic background are expected to favor programs and policies that benefit
people similar to them. If, for instance, a law maker was a member of a protected
class of individuals, via affirmative action, some message recipients of this law
maker might believe he/she will be in favor of a particular affirmative action
legislation that benefits his/her group. If he/she were to vote for this action people
would assume it was because of their heritage. If they violated that expectation
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and voted against the legislation, some message recipients would believe the
action was taken based on the merits of the legislation (in spite of the legislator’s
background) and therefore, more credible.
External influences are environmental factors that are expected to bias a
communicator. Observers may feel that a communicator’s education about a
specific issue is non-representative of the whole issue. For example, a person
with a degree from a Christian college might be expected to have a more
conservative stance on some issues. If he/she were to take a more progressive
stance we would assume he/she was taking this stance in spite of his/her
background; that, therefore, his/her knowledge in general must be greater than
previously expected.
Knowledge biases can be thought of as a stereotype. People expect
certain people to act a certain way. When this expectancy is confirmed, the
persuasiveness of the communicator’s message may be reduced. It is believed
that this reduction in persuasiveness is due to a reduction in the perceived
expertise of the communicator (O'Keefe 1990). Eagly and Wood (1978) reject
the argument that confirmation of knowledge bias corresponds to the notion of
expertise; the very notion that a person with a biased set of information would be
thought of as an expert with respect to a field where his/her knowledge about the
topic is biased seems counterintuitive. O’Keefe (1990) seems to be in
agreement, stating that a communicator with a perceived knowledge bias is
perceived as less competent.
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Reporting Bias
A reporting bias occurs when a message recipient believes
communicators may alter their message to conform to the audience to which they
are speaking (Eagly et al. 1978). Message receivers may discount an otherwise
credible source when they perceive a reporting bias. Reporting biases are
believed to occur when a communicator delivers a message that differs from
his/her true beliefs because of perceived external pressures (Pastore and
Horowitz 1955; Eagly et al. 1978). One example of a reporting bias is a message
from a young Republican presidential candidate to members of the AARP
(formerly the American Association of Retired Persons) about the need for
expanding Medicare benefits. A person judging the credibility of the
communicator may believe that this young Republican may not really feel that
Medicare needs to change in as much as they believe the communicator is telling
the audience what it wants to hear.
When a reporting bias is violated message recipients should deem the
communicator more credible. In the example of the young Republican, if the
message were consistent with the expectations of a young Republican and
inconsistent with the desires of the AARP audience the communicator would be
perceived to be more trustworthy with respect to communicating his/her true
beliefs. Eagly and Wood (1978) believe that reporting bias corresponds fairly well
with the trustworthiness factor of credibility in that violations of the reporting bias
indicate a propensity to communicate assertions the communicator believes are
valid without regard to the audience.
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With respect to financial forecasts, it is possible that negative news
forecasts are a violation of a reporting bias. The expectation of positive
information by investors is a perceived reporting bias. Investors expect
management to release positive information, since the release of negative
information causes the stock price of the firm to drop (Lev and Penman 1990;
Skinner 1994; Kasnik and Lev 1995; Libby and Tan 1999). Therefore, when
management releases negative information, it is opposite investor’s expectation’s
(a disconfirmation of the reporting bias) indicating the credibility of the disclosure
should rise. This appears to be supported by research, negative news
announcements cause greater revision in market expectations and are therefore
more credible (Skinner 1994; Stocken 2000; Rodgers and Stocken 2002). 2021
Variables That Moderate the Effect of Credibility
Other factors can influence the magnitude of the effect that credibility can have
on a recipient. Factors such as the recipient’s level of involvement with the task and the
timing of identifying the communicator, along with the position of the message, can
influence the magnitude of the effect of source credibility (O'Keefe 1990). It is important
to note that these factors should not affect credibility, only the amount of influence
credibility has. I will discuss each of these factors. A flowchart is also presented (

20

There is a possibility the market reacts to negative forecasts because of their form. Skinner
(1994) found that negative news forecasts were usually point estimates. Pownall and Waymire
(1989) found that point forecasts revisions in general were more informative than other types.
21
The studies mentioned were not specifically looking at reporting bias although the theory would
help support their findings.
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Figure 4) to aid in understanding how these variables interact with
credibility.
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Figure 4. Moderating Variables to Credibility
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Information
Suprise

Message
Characteristics

Level of Involvement
Recipients with a high level of involvement with respect to the message
are less likely to be influenced by differences in credibility while perceivers with a
low level of involvement are more likely to be affected by source credibility
(Figure 5) (O'Keefe 1990). The relationship between involvement and sensitivity
to source credibility is believed to exist because perceivers that are highly
involved with respect to a particular subject are more likely to form their own
opinions about the validity of the communicator’s statements. Recipients who are
involved in the task at a high-level are more likely to pay attention to the details of
the message and to pick apart the message and base the importance of the
message on its content. In the current study, all participants were believed to
have a low level of involvement with the particular task. None of the participants
in the study were expected to be experts in the field.

Message Recipient’s Level of Involvement

High Level of
Involvement

Credibility Means
Less

Low Level of
Involvement

Credibility Means
More

Receiver’s
Level of
Involvement

Figure 5. O’Keefe’s Level of Involvement Affect on Credibility
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Message
Characteristics
Mean More

Timing of Identifying the Communicator
The timing of identifying a communicator is also believed to impact the
magnitude of effect from source credibility. When a communicator is identified
before a message is received source credibility will have a greater impact on the
perceiver. When the source is identified after the message is received the
perceiver is believed to be more affected by the message characteristics than by
the source credibility (O'Keefe 1990). Figure 6 shows the relationship between
identifying the communicator before and after a message. When a communicator
is identified after a message has been given receivers are likely to pay more
attention to message details as the message is delivered.

Before
Message

Credibility Means
More

Message
Characteristics
Mean Less

After
Message

Credibility Means
Less

Message
Characteristics
Mean More

Timing in
Identifying the
Communicator

Figure 6. Timing of Identifying the Communicator

Influence of Message Direction
The position a communicator takes with his/her message can also affect
the influence of credibility on the perceiver. A communicator can send a message
that is pro-attitudinal or counter-attitudinal with respect the perceiver’s position on
a topic (O'Keefe 1990). Pro-attitudinal messages are in line with prior beliefs of
the perceiver. Counter-attitudinal messages are opposite what the perceiver
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believes. Pro-attitudinal messages diminish the role of credibility in judgments;
whereas, counter-attitudinal messages usually require a more credible
communicator (Figure 7). It is important to understand that pro-attitudinal
messages do not actually reduce the amount of perceived credibility of a
communicator; they just diminish the role credibility plays in the judgment
process for the perceiver. The diminished role of credibility could be a type of
ceiling effect, in that a message recipient who already holds strong beliefs about
a topic has less room for opinion change. Whereas when the message is in the
opposite direction, the participant has more room for opinion change, and
therefore, the role of credibility is enhanced, or at least appears to be as there
will be more room for an effect to be found.

Counterattitudinal
Message

High Credible has
advantage

Pro-attitudinal
message

High Credibility
Effects Diminish

Position of the
Message

Figure 7. Position of Message
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Appendix B: View of Experimental Materials Used for Pilot Study
The following pages show a screen shot of each stage of the experiment with
a brief description of the picture.
1.

General Instructions: Participants are given the general instructions for
completing the task. They are notified of their right to leave the exam at
any time as well as their compensation for participating.
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2.

Appendix B Continued
Informed Consent: Participants have an opportunity to read the
Informed Consent form. They have a yes/no button to indicate
voluntarily consent to participate in the experiment.
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Appendix B Continued
Informed Consent Continued
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Appendix B Continued
Informed Consent Continued
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3.

Appendix B Continued
Instructions: An overview of the task is then given to each participant.
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Appendix B Continued
Instructions: An overview of the task is then given to each participant.
Continued
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4.

5.

Appendix B Continued
Background Information: Participants are instructed as to their role in
the task.

Company Background: Participants are given a brief background about
the company.
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6.

Appendix B Continued
Products: Participants are told about the products the company
produces.
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7.

Appendix B Continued
Internal Control Letter: Participants are given the letter from
management, “Assessment of Internal Controls Over Financial
Reporting.” At this point participants are broken into two groups:
a. Internal Control High Intention letter.
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Appendix B Continued
b. Internal Control No Intention letter.
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8.

9.

Appendix B Continued
Financial Statements: All participants are given the prior income
statement and balance sheet information.
Earnings Per Share Prediction One Period One: Participants give an
estimate of earnings per share.
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10.

11.

Appendix B Continued
Management’s Earnings Per Share Prediction Period One:
Management provides participants with its earnings per share
prediction for the same period. Management’s prediction is 132
percent of the participant’s earnings per share estimate for the same
period.

Earnings Per Share Prediction Two Period One: Participants are given
an opportunity to revise their initial earnings per share predictions.
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12.

Appendix B Continued
Credibility Rating One: Participants fill out the credibility instrument
comprised of 18 Likert scale questions on an eleven-point scale.
a. Six expertise factors
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Appendix B Continued
b. Six intention factors
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Appendix B Continued
c. Six trustworthiness factors
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13.

Appendix B Continued
Earnings Letter: Management informs the participants about the actual
earnings per share for period one. This amount is 109 percent of the
participant’s initial earnings per share estimate. This is 23 percent less
than management’s prediction. There are two different earnings letters:
a. High intention earnings letter.
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Appendix B Continued
b. No intention earnings letter.
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14.

15.

Appendix B Continued
Financial Statements Two: Participants are given a copy of the income
statement for the first period in which they predicted earnings per
share. This also included the three prior years of data.
Earnings Per Share Prediction One Period Two: After reading the
financial statements the participants are asked to make an earnings
per share prediction for the next year.
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Appendix B Continued
16.

Management’s Earnings Per Share Prediction Period Two:
Management provides participants with their earnings per share
prediction for the same period. Management’s prediction is 132
percent of the participant’s earnings per share estimate for the same
period.

17.

Earnings Per Share Prediction for Period Two: Participants are given
an opportunity to revise their initial earnings per share predictions.
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18.

Appendix B Continued
Credibility Rating Two: Participants fill out the credibility instrument
comprised of 18 Likert scale questions on an 11 point scale.
a. Six intention factors

178

Appendix B Continued
b. Six expertise factors
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Appendix B Continued
c. Six trustworthiness factors
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19.

Appendix B Continued
Manipulation Questions: Participants answer manipulation questions
about both letters they have received.
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Appendix B Continued
Manipulation Check Questions Continued

20.

Covariate Questions – Fraud
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Appendix B Continued
Covariate Questions: Fraud Continued

21.

Covariate Questions- Sarbanes Oxley
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22.

Appendix B Continued
Demographic Questions
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23.

Appendix B Continued
Possible Covariate Questions: Prior Investment Experience
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24.

Appendix B Continued
Theoretical Covariates Based on Appendix A
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Appendix B Continued
25.

Feedback Screen

26.

Finished Screen
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Appendix C: Pilot Study One Surprise Testing
Please rate the following items independently
Industry analysts have predicted earnings per share of XYZ Company at $1.23
per share. Management has issued a forecast predicting earnings per share of
$1.35.
Please rate the difference between the analysts’ predictions and management
predictions:
Insignificant
Very Significant
|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not Surprising
Very Surprising
|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Industry analysts have predicted earnings per share of XYZ Company at $1.55
per share. Management has issued a forecast predicting earnings per share of
$1.86.
Please rate the difference between the analysts’ predictions and management
predictions:
Insignificant
Very Significant
|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not Surprising
Very Surprising
|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Industry analysts have predicted earnings per share of XYZ Company at $1.75
per share. Management has issued a forecast predicting earnings per share of
$2.28.
Please rate the difference between the analysts’ predictions and management
predictions:
Insignificant
Very Significant
|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not Surprising
Very Surprising
|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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Appendix C Continued
Industry analysts have predicted earnings per share of XYZ Company at $1.10
per share. Management has issued a forecast predicting earnings per share of
$1.54.
Please rate the difference between the analysts’ predictions and management
predictions:
Insignificant
Very Significant
|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not Surprising
Very Surprising
|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

189

About the Author
Robert David Slater Jr. was born in New Haven, Connecticut, the son of Karen
and Robert Slater. Robert graduated from Gateway High School in Kissimmee,
Florida in 1989 and entered the University of South Florida in Tampa, Florida. In
December 1995, he graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree in Business
Administration majoring in accounting. He worked as a financial manager for
Michael Steinberg and Associates from 1994 until 1999. In August 1999, he
entered the College of Business at the University of South Florida, earning his
Master’s degree in Accountancy (M.Acc.) in 2003 and a PhD in Accounting in
2007. In June of 2000 he married Elizabeth Hemphill. Robert is a licensed CPA
in the State of Florida and is currently a faculty member at Texas A&M Corpus
Christi.

